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NOTES AND' COMMENTS
TWICE IN JEOPARDY
It is ancient common law that the state cannot twice put a man in
jeopardy for the same offense.' The prohibition was entrenched in En-
glish justice several hundred years before its incorporation into the
Fifth Amendment 2 and the constitutions of most of the states. But
1. Actually, the double jeopardy principle existed in the days of the Greeks and
Romans, finding limited expression in the Digest of Justinian. Canon law contained a
similar principle. There is evidence that a plea similar to double jeopardy may have
appeared in English law as early as the fourteenth century, but the earliest conclusive
evidence of the principle appears in writings of Hale (seventeenth century), and Coke
(seventeenth century), and later in Blackstone (eighteenth century). See generally, Slgler,
A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283, 283-97 (1963).
At common law there were five rules which dealt with the problem with which
double jeopardy deals today. Four were special pleas in bar, and two of them, aut refols
attaint and former pardon, were idiosyncratic to a different criminal procedure and
have little relevance today. See 2 HAWKINS, PLEAs OF THE CROWN 524-52 (8th ed. 1824).
The two other pleas in bar, autrefois acquit (former acquittal) and autrefos convict
(former conviction) prevented reprosecution after a verdict. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES
335-38; 2 HAWKINS, supra, at 515-29. In addition, there was, at common law, a rule
barring discharge of the jury prior to verdict. 3 COKE, INSTrTUTEs 110 (E. and R. Brooke
ed., 1797). This rule appears, however, to have been honored more in the breach than
in the observance. Whitebread and Fenwick, 7 How. St. Tr. 120 and 315; Regina v.
Windsor, 10 Cox C.C. 276 (Q.B. 1865, Ex. Ch. 1866); Brief for the United States,
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). See generally for discussion of the history
of common law double jeopardy: Ex parte Lange 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Comment,
65 YALE L.J. 339, 339-44 (1956).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Supreme Court has construed the protec-
tion as applicable to both felonies and misdemeanors. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163 (1873).
The Supreme Court has twice refused to extend, by incorporation within the Four-
teenth Amendment, federal double jeopardy standards to the states. Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 426 (1953). In Palko, how-
ever, the Court left open the possibility that a more flagrant violation of the double
jeopardy principle might violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 302 U.S. 319, 328. Re-
cently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the implied acquittal rule,
note 11, infra, to the law of the state of New York, declaring sections 464 and 544 of
the N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment to
the extent that they authorize reprosecution in this situation. United States ex rel.
Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 863 (1965). This is the first modern case in which
federal double jeopardy standards have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and applied to the states. But see Ex parte Ulrich, 42 Fed. 587 (1890); Cf., Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
3. Though the phraseologies vary, all states except Connecticut, Maryland, Massa-
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today the rule is more commonly revered than understood. 4
Two features complicate our law of double jeopardy. The prohibi-
tion is not one rule but several, each applying to a different situation;
and each rule is marooned in a sea of exceptions. Thus a general rule
shields a convicted man from retrial for the same offense.5 But the state
chusetts, North Carolina and Vermont have constitutional double jeopardy provisions.
The five states that do not, consider protection from double jeopardy a part of their
common law. See ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAWv: DounLE JEoPARDY 56-59
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1932) (hereafter cited as ALI (1932)). There are, howcvcr, two
crudal questions which these double jeopardy provisions leave unanswered: (1) after
what point in the trial process has defendant been in jeopardy? (2) When are offenses
the same?
The first question is the traditional one of "when does jeopardy attach." Frequently it
is said that jeopardy does not attach at all if the court hearing the case did not have
jurisdiction, Johnsen v. United States, 41 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864
(1930); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). or if the
indictment did not charge a crime, State v. Keating, 223 Mo. 86, 94-95, 122 SA.. 699,
700-01 (1909). In such cases a subsequent prosecution in the proper court or on a cured
indictment is permitted on the theory that, since there could have been no valid con-
viction, the defendant was never "in danger" or jeopardy. This legal fiction ignores the
fact that often punishment has been imposed by courts lacking jurisdiction, or following
conviction on a defective indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 15 F.2d 207 (D. Del.
1926). Some courts have reasonably concluded that an acquittal on the merits in such
cases bars reprosecution, and this seems to be the rule in the federal system. See United
States v. Lewis, 173 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1960)
(the affirnmance was only of convictions on counts not subject to the double jeopardy
defect).
Assuming a requisite jurisdiction, most courts hold that jeopardy in the first prosecu-
tion does not attach until the jury is empanelled, Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1931), or, in non-jury trials, until the first evidence is presented or a guilty
plea accepted, Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d 539 (1958). This rule over-
looks the very real possibility that successive indictments, though dismissed before trial,
may be used as instruments of oppression and may be nearly as vexatious to the defendant
as a series of trials. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954):
Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 537 (1952). For an excellent discussion of the inadequacy of these
double jeopardy rules, see Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 357-59 (1956). Nevertheless, it
may be that drawing the line where most courts do represents a reasonable compromise
between protecting the accused from the harassment of repeated insuflicient indictments.
and protecting the state's interest in bringing alleged offenders to trial. See Note, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1275 (1963).
This Comment will not address itself to all these questions, but will rather attempt
to provide guidelines for answering the second question: when are offenses the same?
Throughout the comment the phrase "double jeopardy provisions" refers to both state
and federal constitutions.
4. "The ridde of double jeopardy stands out today as one of the most commonly
recognized yet most commonly misunderstood maxims in the law, the passage of time
having served in the main to burden it with confusion upon confusion." Note, 24
MIfNN. L. Rv. 522 (1940). And it is not always revered. One writer has called it a
"quaint relic of medieval jargon." Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 675
(1926).
5. See note 12, infra.
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may retry a defendant whose conviction was reversed on appeal.0 Even
if the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, he is
said to have "waived" his double jeopardy right by appealing.7 Simi-
larly, a rule prohibits retrial when the first trial was prematurely ter-
minated.8 But if the trial is curtailed because the judge coerced a guilty
plea, the judge's action is labeled "reversible error" rather than "pre-
mature termination." These fictions and rationalizations are the char-
acteristic signs of doctrinal senility.10
6. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896). For a discussion of the rationales
which courts have used to explain why retrial after conviction does not constitute
double jeopardy, see Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Pros-
ecutions, 74 HARv. L. Ryv. 1, 6-8 (1960). In England the policy of finality was so strongly
felt that the convicted defendant was not entitled to a writ of error or request for a
new trial, and the state was not entitled to appeal acquittals. In this country, tile
English rule was followed by Mr. Justice Story, sitting on circuit, in United States v.
Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) but was rejected by other
federal courts, e.g., United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131, 137 (No. 15301) (C.C.ED.
Pa. 1846), and has been consistently rejected ever since. The English rule that an appeal
is not available to the state after an acquittal persists in all but three states; and It was
squarely held in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) that appeal by the federal
government would violate the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.
Commentators have criticized the opinion for both its logic and for its practical effect.
See note 126, infra.
7. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
8. Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (1931). Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963). The states also take a dim view of reprosecution after a premature termina-
tion of the original trial. See Mr. Justice Vinson's dissent in Brock v. North Carolina,
344 U.S. 424, 436 (1953). See generally Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1272 (1964).
9. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 (1964).
10. Another exception in double jeopardy doctrine, and one not dealt with in this
Comment, is that of dual sovereignty. At common law, it seems that the pleas In bar
operated to prevent a second prosecution or punishment even when the laws of different
sovereigns were involved. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF rTa CROWN 515, at 517, 522 (acquittal in
Wales a bar in England). In the United States this problem is most acute with respect
to conduct that offends both the law of a state and that of the federal government,
though occasionally the problem is one of concurrent state and municipal jurisdiction,
State v. Hansen, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939) and, even more rarely, concurrent
state and state jurisdiction, Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
With respect to the federal-state overlap, in the early cases federal law was said
to supersede state law. See Jett v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 933, 937-39 (1867)
for a discussion of the early rule. Subsequently the Supreme Court indicated Its willing-
ness to alter the former rule. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850). Then, in 1922, the Supreme Court clearly adopted
the "rule of successive prosecutions," in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377. Recently
this rule was affirmed in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), where a defendant who
had been acquitted of bank robbery in a federal court was prosecuted and convicted
in the state court for the same robbery, and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959), where a defendant who had been convicted in a state court was then prosecuted
and convicted in a federal court for the same destruction of property. Since 1959, however,
it has been the policy of the Justice Department not to duplicate state prosecutions.
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Three rules are central to the double jeopardy prohibition: the rules
which bar retrial for the same offense after acquittal,"1 retrial for
the same offense after conviction,'2 and multiple punishment for the
MIEMORANDUm TO THE UNITED STATES ATroRNEYs, Department of Justice Press Release,
April 6, 1959. This policy has been somewhat grudgingly acquiesced in by the Supreme
Court. Cf., Petite v. United States, 361 US. 529 (1960).
The problem of state prosecutions duplicating federel prosecutions has been somewhat
alleviated by the statutes of about 15 states which prohibit a subsequent state prosecution.
ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
Various solutions to the problem of dual sovereignty are suggested in, Note, 45 COrtNELL
L.Q. 574 (1960). See generally, Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32
COLUm. L. Rxv. 1309 (1932); Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common
Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1956); Frank, An International
Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096 (1959); The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HAnv. L. 1REv. 84, 157 (1959).
11. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa; "no one should be twice vexed
for one and the same cause." Retrial after an acquittal was barred at common law by the
plea of autrefois acquit. Under the Fifth Amendment a verdict of acquittal is final and
even if "not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense." United States v. Ball, 163 US. 662, 671 (1896). The federal government may
not appeal a verdict of acquittal even though it may appear to be erroneous. Kepner v.
United States, 195 US. 100 (1904).
Although the Fifth Amendment has been held not to preclude government appeals with
respect to the states, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), many state courts have
held government appeal unconstitutional. E.g. People v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529 (1886). Cf.,
ALI (1932) section 28.
In 1957, the federal rule was extended to bar reprosecution after an "implicit acquittal."
Green v. United States, 355 US. 184, 190 (1957). In this case, defendant was tried for first
and second degree murder and convicted of second degree. The Supreme Court held that
this verdict constituted an implied acquittal of first degree murder, and that defendant, in
appealing his second degree conviction, did not wvaive his double jeopardy claim with
respect to first degree. Cf. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), distinguished and
in effect overruled by the Green court. While some states already had such a rule, many
did not. 355 US. 184, 216 n.4 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Annot., 61
A.L.R.2d 1141 (1958).
In Green, the Supreme Court pointed out that compelling the defendant to waive his
former jeopardy with respect to the greater offense would discourage him from appealing
an erroneous conviction. Either he went to prison on a possibly erroneous conviction or
took the chance that upon retrial after a successful appeal, he would be found guilty of the
greater offense. The court concluded that the law "does not place the defendant in such
an incredible dilemma." 355 US. 184, 193. The Supreme Court of California, following
this "incredible dilemma" rationale, has recently extended the implied acquittal doctrine
to punishment as well as offenses. In People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677
(1963), defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life. He success-
fully appealed and on retrial was again convicted and this time sentenced to death. Judge
Traynor found it immaterial to the basic purpose of double jeopardy whether the implied
acquittal was for a legislatively or a judicially graded crime. Since the first jury had
"acquitted" defendant of the death sentence, the court held he could not subsequently
be "convicted" of the sentence. For a general discussion of the case, see Van Alstynie. In
Gideon's Wake, 74 YA.LE L.J. 606 (1965). Cf., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
12. Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delecto,--"'one punishment for one wrong." Retrial
after a conviction was barred at common law by the pleas of autrefois convict and
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same offense at one trial. 13 The courts understand these rules as ex-
pressions of self-evident moral principles: it is wrong to retry a man for
a crime of which he previously has been found innocent, wrong to ha-
rass him with vexatious prosecution, and wrong to punish him twice
for the same crime. Inquiry usually stops here. We are rarely told why
it is wrong to retry for the same crime or punish twice. We never learn
precisely what constitutes harassment, nor when it will bar reprosecu-
tion. The judiciary is content to apply the double jeopardy prohibition
with only a reverent nod to its policies.
Several policies underlie the double jeopardy prohibition.14 First,
autrefois attaint. See note 1 supra. In Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873),
the Supreme Court explained why reprosecution is barred following a conviction: It Is not
the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty, but the punishment that
would legally follow the second conviction.
There is little question that the framers were concerned with multiple punishment.
Indeed, Madison's first double jeopardy proposal read:
No person shall be subject ... to more than one punishment or one trial for the
same offense.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS [1789-91] at 433 (1834). And Mr. Benson, of New York, understood
the provision as embodying the "humane intention . . . to prevent more than one
punishment." Id. at 753. Some courts have expressed greater disapproval over reprosecu-
tion after a conviction than after an acquittal, Wright v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. R. 152
(1884); In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889), and one commentator has concluded that
former conviction, as distinguished from former acquittal, is based upon natural law.
Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 RuroEms L. Rlv. 487, 492 (1957).
13. It is clear that preventing multiple punishment for the same offense was foremost in
the minds of the framers of the double jeopardy clause. Note 12, supra. Until joinder
became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only
from multiple trials.
The Supreme Court has indicated that multiple punishment for the same offense at a
single trial is forbidden by double jeopardy. In Ex parte Lange, the Court stated that "the
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for
the same offence as from being twice tried .. " 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874),
approved in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-09 (1931). In a line of cases, the
Supreme Court has assumed that multiple punishment for the same offense would violate
the double jeopardy provision, but has generally found the offenses to be distinct. Morgan
v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1911);
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 378-81 (1906); Carter v. McClanghry, 183 U.S. 365,
388-90 (1902). See also, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947 ("Our
minds rebel against permitting the same sovereignty to punish an accused twice for tile
same offense.') But see contra: Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941).
14. The "policies of double jeopardy" discussed in this Comment are drawn from
diffuse sources. Some are clearly historical policies, as old as the principle Itself. Others
may or may not be of such ancient stock; they have been developed over many years,
chiefly by the judiciary. But since policy confusion is the chief confusion In double
jeopardy law, one of the aims of this Comment will be to distinguish between and to
order different sorts of policy considerations. Some of these are recommended more by the
realities of current criminal procedure than by history. But no apology is in order. Double
jeopardy cannot be so unalterably affixed to history as some have suggested. See, Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.). For double
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guilt should be established by proving the elements of a crime to the
satisfaction of a single jury, not by capitalizing on the increased proba-
bility of conviction resulting from repeated prosecutions before many
juries. Thus reprosecution for the same offense after an acquittal is
prohibited.' 5 Second, the prosecutor should not be able to search for
an agreeable sentence by bringing successive prosecutions for the same
offense before different judges.'6 Thus reprosecution after a conviction
is prohibited. Third, criminal trials should not become an instrument
for unnecessarily badgering individuals.'7 Thus the Constitution for-
bids a second trial-a second jeopardy-and not merely a conviction
at the second trial. Finally, judges should not impose multiple punish-
ment for a single legislatively defined offense.18 Thus multiple punish-
ment for the same offense at a single trial is prohibited.
For a time it was thought that the rules prohibiting retrial and mul-
tiple punishment at one trial were doctrinal twins, and that therefore
the same test should be used to determine whether either rule was vio-
lated. More recently, some commentators have concluded that retrial
and multiple punishment are different problems to be resolved differ-
ently.'9 The problems are different and do require different resolu-
tions. But the two rules have a common core policy. They prevent
prosecutors and courts from prosecuting and punishing arbitrarily,
without legitimate justification.
Discovering The "Same Offense"
The rules which bar retrial and multiple punishment have a crucial
similarity. Their scope depends on what is meant by "the same of-
fense." Consider the following criminal activities. Defendant robs two
banks on different days.20 Defendant enters a tavern, holds tvelve pa-
jeopardy, in its early days, was integral to a different society and different criminal pro-
cedure. See, e.g., texts cited in note 1, supra, for discussion of autrefois attaint. Sigler, A
History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr. 283, 283-98 (1963). The author of an
exhaustive history of double jeopardy aptly concludes that:
The policy and purpose of double jeopardy must be a function of the criminal law
and procedure of a social system. Double jeopardy, even when established as a
general principle, may be empty of specific content.
Id. at 309.
15. See notes 81-87, infra, and accompanying text.
16. See notes 88-103, infra, and accompanying text.
17. See notes 115-25, infra, and accompanying text.
18. See notes 271-73, infra, and accompanying text.
19. Note, 11 STAN. L REv. 735 (1959); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956); ALI, MODEL
PENAL CODE 66 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
20. United States v. Koury, 319 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1963).
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trons at gunpoint, and robs them.21 Defendant fires a gun and injures
two victims. 22 Defendant transports across a state border two forged
securities. 23 In these four situations, each defendant has transgressed a
single statute several times. In the first case the violations were tempo-
rally distinct; in the third and fourth cases the violations were simulta-
neous; in the second case the violations were temporally proximate but
not simultaneous. Next, consider the following criminal activities. De-
fendant murders on July 10 and rapes on August 10. Defendant con-
spires to commit a crime and subsequently commits the crime.24 De-
fendant sells moonshine liquor which is in his possession.25 Defendant
rapes his sister.26 Defendant assaults and murders his victim.2 7 In these
five situations, each defendant has transgressed two statutes. 28
The critical double jeopardy question is clear. In which of these
cases should the offenses be deemed the same for purposes of reprosecu-
tion? For multiple punishment at a single trial? The answer may also
at first appear to be clear. According to ordinary language, two offenses
are the same offense only if they are identical in law and fact, only
when one statute has been violated once. One may commit an offense
against humanity, against our aesthetic or moral sensibility, against
God, or against the law. The phrase "has committed an offense" is used
as a substitute for "has failed to comply with some important stan-
dard"; and the number of offenses depends upon the number of stan-
21. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). Or he cuts open nine mailbags In the
course of one robbery. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
22. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632
(1895). Or he negligently runs down two pedestrians at one time. Smith v. State, 159,
Tenn. 64, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929).
23. Castle v. United States, 287 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.), vacated, 368 U.S. 13 (1961). Or, in
one trip, he transports several women across state lines for immoral purposes. United
States v. St. Clair, 66 F. Supp. 795 (D.C. Va. 1945) (permitting separate punishment for
each woman); Robinson v. United States, 143 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1944) (permitting just
one punishment). Or he transports, in one trip, a gun and ammunition. Mercado v.
United States, 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950).
24. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United States v. Callanan, 274 F.2d
601 (8th Cir.), af'd, 364 U.S. 587 (1959).
25. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927). Or he buys and conceals narcotics
knowing them to have been illegally imported. United States v. Brown, 207 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1953).
26. Stewart v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 174, 32 SAV. 766 (1895) (multiple punishment
permitted). Or he commits sodomy upon his sister. People ex rel. Porter v. Jackson, 303
N.Y. 680, 102 N.E.2d 837 (1951). Contra: State v. Price, 127 Iowa 301, 103 N.W. 195 (1905).
27. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1911); State v. Jellison, 104 Md. 281, 71 AtI.
716 (1908).
28. For a discussion of the various ways multiple offenses can be committed and of the
courts' reactions, see Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21
MINN. L. REv. 805 (1937).
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dards violated. In the criminal law, as distinguished from aesthetics,
the standards are discrete and precise. Each legal offense category (that
is, whatever the legislature says is an offense) is a distinct standard, and
each failure to comply with a standard constitutes, in ordinary lan-
guage, an offense.2
But the courts have never used such a narrow definition of offense.
Most courts sense that the policies of double jeopardy embrace closely
related or overlapping offenses as well. This insight has led to the ap-
plication of a mechanical test for defining an offense, a test which is
more generous than ordinary language, but arbitrarily so.
This Comment will examine briefly the most popular offense-defin-
ing tests, and then reconstruct them to conform to the policies of the
double jeopardy prohibition.30 It will be suggested that offenses should
be deemed the same for the purpose of reprosecution whenever they
could have prosecuted at a single trial. And it will be suggested that
the double jeopardy clause compels a rule of strict construction in de-
termining whether multiple punishment may be imposed at a single
trial.
The Offense-Defining Tests
Two approaches have been used in formulating offense-defining
tests: the evidentiary, and the behavioral. Each of these, in turn, may
be subdivided. Required evidence tests hold that offenses are "the
same" if the elements of one are sufficiently similar to the elements of
another.31 Alleged evidence tests find offenses the same if there is
sufficient similarity between the allegations of the two indictments.3-
29. Thus even a criminal who in one assault violates a statute proscribing assault with
intent to kill and a statute proscribing simple assault (necessarily included offenses) has
committed two offenses. In this respect, the ordinary language meaning of offense would
seem to correspond to the meaning indicated by the identity test. However, the identity
test, ordaining that offenses are not the same unless identical in law and fact, makes an
exception for necessarily included offenses. See note 53 infra.
30. See note 14 supra.
31. Required evidence tests are the most popular variety. This majority view was stated
in United States v. Brimsdon, 23 F. Supp. 510, 512 (W.D. Mo. 1938). as follows: "The
constitutional guaranty is against double jeopardy for the same offense. There is no consti-
tutional guaranty against a repetition of evidence in trials for different offenses." See ALI
(1932) 28-35.
32. See, e.g., People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924). This test falls
somewhere between the required and actual evidence tests. If the allegations are examined
with a view to the essential facts it is much like the elements test If, on the other hand,
the evidential allegations are considered, it begins to resemble more the actual evidence
test. That is, it bars or permits a second prosecution on the basis of the anticipated actual
evidence. The evidentiary factual allegations formulation has been criticized because it
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Actual evidence tests find the offenses the same if there is a similarity
between the evidence presented at the two trials.8 3 The behavioral
approach focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than on the prose-
cutor's evidence. Courts which use this second approach adopt an act,
transaction, or intent test.34
The evidence approach is older and more popular.3 5 The original
"same evidence" test was designed to compensate for an absurdity of
common law pleading. At common law the slightest variance between
the allegation and proof was fatal to the prosecution." Since a plea of
former acquittal barred reprosecution for the same offense, 7 this vari-
makes the issue of double jeopardy turn upon the "accidental inclusion of superfluous
allegations." Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 462, 463 (1931).
33. E.g., Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 103, 109, 143 P. 64 (1914). In tile recent famous
New York case of Martinis v. Supreme Court, 15 N.Y.2d 240, 206 N.E.2d 165 (1965), three
of the seven justices felt that the required evidence test permitted rcprosecutlon for
vehicular homicide after an acquittal for reckless driving, and three felt that the same
test prohibited it. The swing man, Judge Burke, felt that the second trial should proceed
but that the actual evidence test should be applied to the evidence presented at the second
trial to see if it would have been sufficient to convict of the offense charged at the first.
The case was remanded for a new trial on the vehicular homicide charge. In order that a
new trial might be avoided if his double jeopardy ruling were overruled, Judge Silverman,
of the N.Y. Supreme Court, allowed the case to go to the jury before passing on that
issue. The jury was unable to agree. Addressing himself to the double jeopardy question,
the judge applied the actual evidence test authorized by Judge Burke and concluded that
the second trial did violate Martinis' right not to be twice placed in jeopardy because the
state's evidence to prove vehicular homicide, though not identical, was much the same as
that presented in the earlier trial to show reckless driving. People v. Martinis, 46 Misc. 2d
1066, 261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1965).
34. A minority of the states apply these tests-Alabama, Georgia, New Jersey, Okla-
homa and Texas. Even in these states the tests are applied sporadically and inconsistently.
Compare Burnam v. State, 2 Ga. App. 395, 58 S.E. 683 (1907) with Harris v. State, 193
Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941). Compare State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1833) with
State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 114 A.2d 573 (1955), a.J'd, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628
(1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
Sometimes offenses are considered "the same" where there is but one motivating Intent
or a single ultimate goal, e.g., Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 682, 21 S.W.2d 400, 402 (1929),
while at other times they are considered the same only if there is but one physical act,
e.g., Landers v. State, 26 Ala. App. 506, 162 So. 550 (1935). Also, about a dozen staten have
enacted statutes which forbid multiple trials and punishment for offenses arising from a
single act. See statutes cited in ALI (1932) 128-29. See also New York, N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 1938. Virginia has forbidden multiple prosecution for one act only when the first trial
results in an acquittal. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-259 (1950). These "same act" statutes do not
provide the defendant with substantial protection. See, e.g., Bullock v. Commonwealth,
205 Va. 867, 140 S.E.2d 821 (1965). In fact, Wisconsin's "same act" statute seems to do
no more than enact the required evidence test. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71. See also note 62
infra.
35. See ALI (1932) 28-35.
36. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Pro-
cedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1173-74 & nn. 76 & 77.
37. The plea was autrefois acquit. Supra note 1.
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ance rule might have set criminals free simply because of the prosecu-
tor's ineptness-an ineptness engendered more by the pedantry of the
pleading system than by the prosecutor's negligence.
In Vandercomb's case, (1796) the source of the same evidence test,
the indictment charged a nocturnal breaking followed by a larceny.38 At
the trial it developed that the larceny had actually been committed a
day earlier, and this variance led to acquittal.39 Since defendants had
been found in the house which they had previously robbed bare, a
"technical acquittal" would have been especially intolerable.4 0 When
the defendants were reprosecuted for the crime they had actually com-
mitted, Judge Buller pronounced the famous test: since evidence of
the offense charged in the second, accurate indictment would not con-
vict on the first indictment, the offenses were different and the second
prosecution permissible. 41 By 1865, this construction of the double
jeopardy prohibition had become so universal that Bishop could state
as a rule that: "When an indictment fails at the trial by reason of a
variance, a subsequent one wherein it is avoided is not barred."-'
Subsequent versions of the same evidence test have not been so func-
tionally designed as the original. In Morey v. Commonwealth, the first
court to apply the test in this country modified it significantly.43 As
formulated by Morey:
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a sub-
sequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evi-
dence required to support a conviction upon one of them would
38. 2 Leach 707, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796). It is perhaps worth noting that the "same
evidence test" was formulated after the Fifth Amendment became a part of the United
States Constitution.
39. Id. at 711, 168 Eng. Rep. at 457.
40. Courts in this country have also been known to alter the scope of the prevailing
offense defining test to fit their own conception of the equities of the case before them.
For instance, in State v. Fredund, 200 Mlinn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937), the court permitted
a manslaughter prosecution following acquittal for the manslaughter of a different victim
in the same accident. The court did not mention in its opinion, as did the prosecutor in
his brief, that two of defendant's witnesses in the first trial had subsequently pleaded
guilty to perjury. Discussed in Note, 24 MirNe. L. REv. 522, 553-55, 560 (1940). See also
Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 Iowa L. mr,. 317, 344-46
(1954). Unfortunately, doctrines twisted to fit the court's conception of the equities in a
particular case have a way of becoming precedents which compel results in subsequent
cases contrary to different equities.
41. The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 2 Leach 707, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796).
Courts using Buller's formulation have invariably extended it to cover the case where the
offense charged in the second indictment is one which was necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first. E.g., People v. Raymond, 87 Cal. App. 510, 262 Pac. 442 (1927).
42. 1 Bisuop, Naw CoMmENTAR Es ON THE CRI MNAL LAW § 1052 (8th ed., 1892).
43. 108 fass. (12 Browne) 433 (1871).
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have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. (Em-
phasis supplied.)44
Morey changed the original test in two ways. First, prior convictions
were held to give no more immunity from reprosecution than prior
acquittals, even though the policy of preventing variances from caus-
ing binding acquittals is irrelevant in prior conviction cases. Second, if
the evidence of either offense would be sufficient to convict of the
other, the later prosecution is barred. Under the Vandercomb test re-
prosecution would not be barred unless evidence necessary to convict
under the second indictment would be sufficient to convict under the
first indictment. Further, Morey underscores that the crucial evidence
is not the evidence actually presented, but rather that minimally nec-
essary to prove the crime charged.
After Morey, same evidence tests grew fruitful and multiplied. Vir-
tually every species has had its day.45 Among courts which follow either
the original formulation or the Morey "two-way" revision, most agree
that the relevant evidence is that required by the statutes, 40 but some
rely on the evidence alleged or actually presented.4 7 Frequently, how-
ever, it is difficult to determine whether a court is using the required
or alleged evidence test.48 Some jurisdictions find the same evidence
test suitable for prior acquittals but not prior convictions; 40 others re-
serve it for multiple punishment questions.0°
44. Id. at 434.
45. See generally ALI (1932) 28-36; Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 81-93 (1937); Lugar,
supra note 40, at 321-23.
46. In United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961), Judge Friendly,
following the Morey formulation, expressly rejected the argument that the same evidence
test barred reprosecution because the evidence actually presented to prove an illegal
agreement at the second trial had also been presented at the first trial. He endorsed the
required evidence test.
47. Justice Rutledge (then sitting on the D.C. circuit) preferred to rely on the actual
evidence rather than either the alleged or required evidence.
"The test [same evidence test] therefore is useful only in relation to the evidence
actually offered, not in relation to that required to prove the greater offense." District of
Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 658 (1942).
48. See, e.g., People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150, 155, 34 Pac. 642, 643 (1893), where the
court, quoting 1 BISHOP, NEW CO MENTAIMS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 1052 (1892), said the
test is "'whether, if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved tnder the
first, there could have been a conviction, '" (emphasis added) and then apparently went
on to apply the required evidence test. Similarly, it may be difficult to tell whether the
court is using an actual evidence test or a transaction test. E.g., People v. Martinis, 46
Misc. 2d 1066, 261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1965). See note 33 supra.
49. Wright v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. R. 152 (1884). The Texas court felt that the
same transaction test should be used in former acquittal cases, and the same evidence test
only where the first trial resulted in conviction. See also In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
50. See Note, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735, 743 & n.37 (1959), where the transaction test Is
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The courts have developed three additional formulations of the
same evidence test. First, according to the "backwards" test, offenses
are not the same unless the defendant could have been convicted of
the second offense on the evidence required (or alleged or offered) at
the first trial.51 Second, according to the "distinct elements" test, of-
fenses are not the same if each contains an element not included in
the other.52 And third, according to the "identity" test, offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes only if they are identical in
law and factY3 Both the distinct elements and identity tests depend
upon the evidence required to convict, not the evidence actually in-
troduced at trial.54
approved for multiple prosecutions but not for multiple punishment at a single trial. See
also separate opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Abbate v. United States, 359 US. 187,
196 (1959).
51. State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 33 Ad. 11 (1895). See generally, 7 BRooKYN L luv.
79, 83 (1937). Courts using Buller's rule backwards usually permit an exception where
the offense charged in the first indictment is necessarily included in the second. E.g..
Franklin v. State, 85 Ga. 570, 11 S.E. 876 (1890). If there is an acquittal at the first trial,
reprosecution for the greater offense should be barred by collateral estoppel. See notes
104-14 infra and accompanying text.
52. This formulation has been the rule in the federal system since Gavieres v.
United States, 220 US. 338, 342 (1911), where it was held that:
A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under either statute does not exempt defendant from prosecution and punishment
under the other.
Many states follow this rule, frequently citing Gavieres, but since 1960 it has been the
policy of the Attorney General to request the Court to vacate sentences resulting from
a second prosecution, even if the prosecution was permissible under the Gavieres rule,
rather than risk review of the rule, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 US. 529, 530-31
(1960). This has been the practice even if the first trial resulted in an acquittal not on
the merits, e.g., Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. 723 (1962), vacating per curiam, 300
F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 1962). While recognizing the unfairness of two prosecutions in such
situations, the Attorney General insists that the procedure is constitutional. Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan, however, felt that the constitutional question should
have been reached, and that double jeopardy barred the second proceedings. See
separate opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Abbate v. United States, 359 US. 187 (1959).
In its application to multiple punishment at a single trial, the distinct fact test is
the prevailing test in the federal system and in most of the states. Harris v. United
States, 359 US. 19 (1959); Blockburger v. United States, 284 US. 299 (1932); Ebeling
v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915). The test is equivalent to the Morey rule when that rule
is applied using the required evidence approach.
53. Burton v. United States, 202 US. 344, 380 (1906). Some courts seem to consider
this test equivalent to the distinct elements test. But the distinct elements test would
not permit prosecution for necessarily included offenses, while the same in law and fact
test would. However, courts using the latter test usually make exception for necessarily
included offenses, and thus it is functionally equivalent to the distinct elements test.
Similarly, Buller's rule and Buller's rule backwards are functionally equivalent to the dis-
tinct elements test, if they are applied on the basis of required evidence and if the usual ex-
ceptions are made. See notes 41 and 51 supra.
54. Because of the various presumptions which the Federal Narcotics statutes es-
1965]
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Attempting to choose which version of the same evidence test would
best implement the double jeopardy prohibition is like deciding which
of five lumberjacks would be most handy with a violin. Even the best
same evidence test is insensitive to the policies of the double jeopardy
clause. The original same evidence test had an intelligible policy. But
the variance problem for which the test was apposite has largely van-
ished."s And even if the variance problem had not disappeared, there
is no apparent reason to apply the test in former conviction cases, since
variance is a harmful technicality only when the defendant is acquitted
because of the variance.
If the goal of the same evidence test is to prevent arbitrary reprose-
cution, then the tests based on the actual evidence presented at the
second trial are fairer than those which depend upon the minimum
of evidence required by the statute, or that alleged in the indictment.
Suppose the first trial is for drunken driving, and results in acquittal.
The prosecutor follows up with a manslaughter charge. Under the re-
quired evidence test, the second prosecution would be permitted be-
cause manslaughter can be proved without drunkenness. But if the
prosecutor's proof amounts only to the evidence of drunkenness re-
jected at the first trial, the actual evidence test would bar relitigation60
tablish, the distinction between required evidence and actual evidence may have a
bizarre significance. In Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959), for example, tile
government's evidence consisted solely of some heroin and the testimony that It had been
in the possession of the defendant. The statutes provide that such evidence raises the
presumption that (1) defendant purchased the heroin from an unstamped package in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and (2) received and concealed it knowing it to be
illegally imported in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174. In Harris, the accused's defense was
an alibi and he did not try specifically to rebut either of the presumptions. He was
convicted on both counts. In fact the same evidence was required to convict on both
counts and, in this case, did. Presumably, however, because the offenses charged had
distinct elements the proof of which might have required different evidence had the
defendant tried to rebut the presumptions, the Court considered the offenses different
and punished for both. The Court felt bound to follow the precedent established by
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). But see dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.
at 357 U.S. 397.
55. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1175-78 & nn.82-93 (1960). See generally ORYIEta, CtIMINAL
PROCEDURE FRos ARREsT TO APPEAL 194-265 (1947).
56. That is, the judge, after hearing the evidence, would decide if that evidence
would have convicted of the offense charged at the first trial (or was substantially the
same evidence, or tried to prove the same conduct, whichever standard is employed).
If he finds the requisite similarity in evidence, he might uphold the double jeopardy
plea, never submitting the case to the jury. In the Martinis case, however, the trial judge
at the second trial submitted the case to the jury, even though lie had decided that
the double jeopardy plea should be sustained, because he felt that if his double jeopardy
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Unfortunately, the best that can be said for the actual evidence test
is that it is not the worst. Since a major purpose of the double jeopardy
prohibition is to preclude vexatious reprosecution, it is senseless to
compel a defendant to undergo the second trial in order to determine
whether it is barred.
Since none of the evidence tests define an offense in accordance with
ordinary language,57 it is apparent that the courts have recognized that
offense is a term of art, to be shaped by policies. But, as we shall see,
none of the tests is adequate to implement the basic policies of double
jeopardy. Bishop aptly describes the same evidence approach as one
"which, if fully adopted, could render practically void the constitu-
tional inhibition."58
Some state courts, and legislatures, searching for a more generous
approach to the double jeopardy prohibition, have focused on the
"criminal transaction."59 The tests which follow this approach, the
same act,60 same transaction,"' and same intent tests,c - depend upon the
ruling were reversed, all would be saved the burden of still another trial. As it turned
out, the jury was hung. 261 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
57. See note 29, supra and accompanying text.
58. 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 1048 (9th ed. 1923).
59. Because many double jeopardy multiple conviction daims have arisen in multiple
trial situations (the plea was entered in bar at the commencement of the second pros.
ecution), it is difficult to determine whether the courts using a transaction test were
concerned over the harassment resulting from multiple prosecution or the multiple
punishment resulting from multiple convictions. Many courts have not realized that a
transaction test may be appropriate for the multiple trial problem, but not for multiple
punishment at a single trial. They have felt that the same test must be applied in
both situations. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770 (1924). On the assump-
tion that the transaction test would permit only one punishment for a series of acts
violating several statutes, it has been criticized as a "defendant's rule." Comment,
What Constitutes Double Jeopardy?, 38 J. Cami. L., C. & P.S. 379, 384 (1947); note
19, supra.
60. Worley v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 240, 275 Pac. 399 (1929) (conviction of arson for
burning goods in a store barred prosecution for destroying insured goods); Sexton v.
Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 495, 236 S.W. 956 (1922) (conviction or acquittal of breach of the
peace bars prosecution for assault and battery, if based on the same act of defendant); and
see note 34, supra.
61. Crumley v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1922); Fews v. State,
1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S.E. 61 (1907); State v. Greely, 30 N.J. Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639
(1954); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918).
62. United States v. Adams, 281 US. 202, 204 (1930). State v. DeGraffenreid, 68 Tenn.
(9 Baxt.) 287 (1878).
Because the limits of an act or transaction cannot be determined until we know the
level of abstraction at which we are to parcel a course of conduct, courts applying the
act and transaction tests have had to find another concept with which to give these
terms content. Many courts have chosen "intent" as the proper standard. For each
activity motivated by a distinct intent there is said to be a different act.
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defendant's behavior, rather than the evidence or laws. Reprosecution
and multiple punishment will be barred if the defendant's conduct
constituted a single act or transaction, or was motivated by a single
intent. The principal shortcoming of this approach is that any se-
quence of conduct can be defined as an "act" or a "transaction." An
act or transaction test itself determines nothing.
The beginning of sense, not to say wisdom, is to realize that
"doing an action" . . . is a highly abstract expression-it is a
stand-in used in place of any (or almost any?) verb with a personal
subject, in the same sort of way that "thing" is a stand-in for any
(or when we remember, almost any) noun substantive .... So we
come easily to think of our own behavior over any time, and of a
life as a whole, of consisting in doing now action A, next action
B, then action C, and so on, just as elsewhere we come to think of
the world as consisting of this, that, and the other substance or ma-
terial thing, each with its own properties. All "actions" are as ac-
tions equal, composing a quarrel with striking a match, winning a
war with sneezing: worse still, we assimilate them one and all to
the supposedly most obvious and easy cases, such as posting letters
or moving fingers, just as we assimilate all "things" to horses or
beds.63
Whether any span of conduct is an act depends entirely upon the
verb in the question we ask. A man is shaving. How many acts is he
doing? Is shaving an act? Yes. Is changing the blade in one's razor an
act? Yes. Is applying lather to one's face an act? . . . Yes, yes, yes.
We should not be surprised that presenting a forged check to the
cashier and accepting the cash, for example, are two acts in Virginia, 4
though they would be one in California.", And since the term "trans-
action" is equally chameleonic, it is not shocking that in Georgia, a so-
Thus, in Fews v. State, 1 Ga. App. 122, 125, 58 S.E. 64 (1907), for example, where
the defendant had shot two people in a scuffle, the court found two transactions, holding
that ". . . the intent to kill was directed against them individually; the fact that tile
interval between the shootings was slight does not make the transactions Identical."
Similarly, the courts of New York and California, in construing statutes which provide
that an act or omission made punishable by different provisions of the criminal law
may be punished under any one provision, but not under more than one, have usually
defined act by intent. "Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the Intent
and objective of actor." Neal v. California, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 19, 357 P.2d 839, 84 (1960).
People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1952). See also note 34 supra.
63. J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in OIwxNARY LANGUAGE, 41, 44 (1964).
64. Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 867, 140 S.E.2d 821 (1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L.
Week 3180 (Nov. 23, 1965).
65. The conduct would probably be considered one act because the defendant had
a single objective, to cash a forged check. E.g., People v. Keller, 212 C.A.2d 210, 27 Cal.
Reptr. 805 (1963). (Defendant who conspired to commit burglary and attempted to
commit burglary could be punished for only one offense.) See note 62 supra.
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called transaction state, two offenses do not constitute one transaction
unless the offenses are the same in law and fact.6
To say that "transaction" is a shapeless term is not to say that it is
useless. Its utility depends upon the way we define it. But before un-
dertaking such a definition, we must understand what we are trying to
accomplish.
REPROSECUTION
In its traditional application, double jeopardy is a rule of finality:
a single fair trial on a criminal charge bars reprosecution. Double jeop-
ardy shares the purposes of civil law rules of finality; 7 it protects the
defendant from continuing distress,08 enables him to consider the mat-
ter closed and to plan ahead accordingly,69 and saves both the public
and defendant the cost of redundant litigation. But double jeopardy is
not simply res judicata dressed in prison grey.70 It was called forth
more by oppression than by crowded calendars.7 ' It equalizes, in some
66. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 118, 17 S.E.2d 73, 78 (1941).
67. For a discussion of the policies of res judicata, the civil law analogue to double
jeopardy, see Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Note, 64 YALE U.J. 436 nA3
(1955); lB MfooRE, Fx DERAL PRACrCE 0.405-0.422 (2d ed. 1965); Developments in the
Law&--Res Judicata, 65 HAv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
68. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (the constitutional provision serves
to prevent the state from wearing out the accused by a multitude of trials).
69. Manifestly, reprosecutions after an acquittal, even if they do not result in a
conviction, may frustrate the accused's attempt to order his life with a reasonable ex-
pectation about his future. In some cases, this may be true even when the first trial
results in conviction. In United States v. Candelaria, the court pointed out that, with
respect to an incarcerated prisoner, the threat of a second prosecution may interfere with
rehabilitation. 131 F. Supp. 797, 805 (1955). "The inmate who has a detainer against
him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a
training program." Quoted from Handbook on Interstate Crime Control in Candelaria,
at 806.
70. The underlying idea [of the double jeopardy prohibition] ... is that the state
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 US. 184, 187-88 (1957). For an excellent discussion of the
policies upon which the prohibition rests, see Comment, 65 YAE LJ. 339, 34041 (1956).
71. See Ex parte Lange, 85 US. (18 Wall.) 163, 171 (1873), quoting with approval
from the Kentucky case of Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Littell 137 (182-4):
... every person acquainted with the history of governments must know that state
trials have been employed as a formidable engine in the hands of a dominant
administration.... To prevent this mischief the ancient common law.. . provided
that one acquittal or conviction should satisfy the law... To perpetuate this wise
rule, so favorable and necessary to the liberty of the citizen in a government like
ours, so frequently subject to changes in popular feeling and sentiment, was the
design of introducing into our Constitution the clause in question.
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measure, the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants. 72 It re-
flects not only our demand for speedy justice, but all of our civilized
caution about criminal law-our respect for a jury verdict and the pre-
sumption of innocence, our aversion to needless punishment, our dis-
tinction between prosecution and persecution. Distilled, these diffuse
considerations yield three rules designed to implement three particular
policies. First, the double jeopardy bar on reprosecution after an acquit-
tal makes the status of innocence meaningful and minimizes the chance
that innocent men will be convicted. 8 Without a rule of finality no
procession of juries could effectively acquit a defendant, but a single
jury could convict3 4 The prosecutor could keep trying until he found
an accommodating panel. Second, the rule prohibiting reprosecution
after a conviction denies the prosecutor the same control over punish-
ment. Without the rule the prosecutor could continue to prosecute
until he found a judge willing to give an "appropriate" sentence. And
if the subsequent judge imposed his sentence cumulatively the defen-
dant would be punished twice for the same offense. The double jeop-
ardy rule forces the prosecutor to accept the first judge's decision on
sentencing just as he must accept the first jury's verdict on guilt. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, rules against reprosecution, after either
prior acquittal or prior conviction, prevent the prosecutor from using
criminal prosecutions to inflict unnecessary suffering upon defendants.
See also, Brief for the United States, pp. 14-15, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734
(1963) (discussion of jury discharge rule as aimed at preventing government oppression).
72. For a comparison of the adversary capabilities of the state with those of the
accused as they stand today, see generally Goldstein, supra note 55.
73. Though several cases have acknowledged this as a policy of double jeopardy (for
example, in State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 370 (1833), the court acknowledged the In-
creased "danger of an erroneous conviction from repeated trials") the importance of
this consideration has been uniformly underestimated. It is true that the criminal
procedure is laced with "safeguards"-the "pre-trial screens"-which In theory help
insure that only "guilty" individuals will be brought to trial. But the efficacy of these
screens as they exist today has been widely questioned. See Goldstein, supra note 55.
Professor Goldstein contends that "the minimal standards of proof employed by these
agencies give very little assurance that persons passed on by them to a later screen are
indeed guilty...." Id. at 1163. Experience has corroborated this position. We cannot
know how many innocent men have been found guilty. But the numerous discovered
wrongful convictions should give us reason to wonder. See, e.g., BORCHIARD, CONVIarING
THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK, NoT GUILTY (1957).
74. For instance, if the evidence were such that one in four juries would convict,
and three in four acquit, the probability of conviction if the defendant is tried once is,
of course, one in four (4/16). If two trials were permitted the defendant would have
to convince two juries of his innocence and the probability of one of the two convicting
would be 1 - (3/4 X /4) = (7/16); assuming the independence of each jury and the
absence of other variables. If he had to convince five juries his probability of conviction
by one would rise to over three in four.
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A criminal trial warps the defendant's life and consumes his money.
The Constitution allows this ordeal to be imposed only once and for
reasonable cause, not repeatedly at the prosecutor's whim.
Before and during the time of Coke, when the rules prohibiting re-
prosecution for the same offense were formulated, prosecutors did
not evade its ban by retrying the defendant on closely related offenses.
Offense categories were relatively few and distinct: 5 the law distin-
guished among rape, arson, and murder, but not between "intimidat-
ing any person from voting" and "interfering with his right to vote."' .6
The conviction rate was so high that reprosecution was rarely neces-
sary37 The ancient plea of autrefois attaint generally barred all further
felony trials after the defendant had been convicted once." But the
profusion of offense categories, and the courts' willingness to discern
separate offenses in essentially unitary behavior,70 have made it possible
for the prosecutor to frustrate the three policies of double jeopardy.80
75. At the time of Henry III there were only eleven felonies. In Coke's time the
number had risen to thirty. Even at the time of our Constitution there were only
160. 2 STEPHEN, CRImNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 219 (1883). Most of this increase is accounted
for by multiplication of offenses in the larceny, quasi-theft category. The statutes
generally related to thefts of different kinds of goods and thus a particular theft would
usually amount to only one offense.
76. Sec. 11(a) No person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit
any person to vote ....
Sec. 11(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intim-
idate, threaten or coerce . . . any person for voting or attempting to vote ....
Sec. 12(a) Whoever . . . shall violate section 11(a) or (b), shall be fined not more
than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Sec. 12(c) Whoever .. . interferes with any right secured by section . .1. 1(a) or (b)
shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
77. 78 Stat. 443 (1965). See Note, 57 YALE .J. 132 & n.1 (1947).
78. The penalty for all felonies was death or deportation. PuTNAM, PROcE DGs
BEFORE JusTicms OF THE PEACE, at CXXXIV (1938); 1 STaHEN, op. cit. supra note 75 at
291. Even when punishment was not actually imposed, the convicted man was considered
"dead in law" and could not be brought to trial. Note 1, supra for sources discussing
the plea of autrefois attaint.
79. At first the courts refused to allow a second prosecution on an indictment
alleging the same facts as the first, but rearranged to fit a different legal theory. Rex v.
Segar, Comb. 401, 90 Eng. Rep. 554 (K.B. 1696). Then, when the state was frequently
deprived of a chance to try the accused on the merits, the courts began to permit
reprosecution on the same facts, but under different legal theory. Note, 57 YALE I.J.
132, 133 (1947). Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
80. It therefore appears that . .. an overzealous prosecuting attorney can, by
assiduously using his Thesaurus and statute-book and continually redefining the
crime, each time requiring slightly different criminal elements, secure repeated
convictions for the same offense.
Note, 7 BROOKLyx L. REv. 79, 82 (1937). And see instances discussed therein.
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Protecting the Innocent
In Hoag v. New Jersey,"' for example, the Supreme Court undercut
the status of innocence by allowing the prosecutor to ignore one jury's
acquittal and obtain a second's conviction. Hoag was first tried for
three counts of robbing A, B, and C in a single transaction. His defense
was an alibi, and he was acquitted.8 2 Subsequently, he was reprosecuted
for robbing D in the same transaction. 3 The Court reasoned that since
the offenses were distinct under the New Jersey same evidence test,
reprosecution was not a second jeopardy for the same offense.84 But the
policies of double jeopardy were violated almost as surely as if Hoag
had been retried for precisely the same charge.85 If, as seems most likely,
the first jury believed Hoag's alibi, the second verdict flatly contra-
dicted the first. Since the alibi provided a valid defense against the
charges of robbing A, B, C, and D, the probability that Hoag was con-
victed wrongfully in the second trial was exactly as high as if he had
been tried again for robbing A, B, and C.88
Hoag involved multiple victims, but cases involving overlapping
offense categories may raise the same problem. Suppose, for example,
defendant is acquitted of reckless driving, when his sole defense was
that he was not driving the vehicle. Subsequently, he is prosecuted
for manslaughter arising out of the same conduct, and he offers the
same defense.87 The second jury convicts. Of course, we cannot know
whether or not the first jury believed his defense; it may have felt that
some other aspect of the prosecutor's case was weak. But if the first jury
did believe his defense, then retrial on the manslaughter charge was
tantamount to a second jeopardy. Double jeopardy should guarantee
that the defendant need convince only one jury of his innocence.
81. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
82. Id. at 465.
83. Id. at 466.
84. Id. at 467.
85. Of course, Hoag's former acquittal was not a complete nullity, He could not
subsequently be proved guilty of having robbed A, 13, and C. But as a practical matter,
Hoag was in no better position at the second trial than if he had been charged with
the same offence. The sole difference was that at trial for only D, he could receive no
more than a single sentence for robbery, whereas at trial for A, B, and C, he might
have been given cumulative sentences. However: first, it is unlikely that New Jersey
would permit cumulative sentences in this situation, State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361
(1833); State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 At. 416 (1919) and second, even if cumulative
sentences were permitted, the vast majority of judges who impose multiple sentences
impose them concurrently.
86. See note 74, supra.




In Ciucci v. Illinois,ss the court undermined the second policy of
double jeopardy. Ciucci murdered his wife and three children, seria-
tim. First he was prosecuted for the murder of his wife, and the state
introduced evidence about the children's deaths.8 9 The jury convicted
and gave Ciucci twenty years. 0 The prosecutor, dissatisfied with the
penalty,91 charged him with murdering one of his daughters, again in-
troduced testimony of all four murders, and won a forty-five year sen-
tence.92 Still unhappy,9 3 the prosecutor brought a third trial for the
murder of one of the sons, again displaying all four murders. Ciucci was
sentenced to death.94
In sentencing Ciucci each jury probably responded to the evidence
of all the murders. To assume otherwise is to credit the jury with mak-
ing almost scholarly distinctions in imposing punishment--distinctions
between the offense and the context in which it is committed. Such
a chaste determination is not only emotionally incredible, but inde-
fensible. Suitable punishment for a crime cannot be determined in
the abstract. The totality of the conduct is relevant to motive, char-
acter, and culpability.95 If, as we have assumed, each jury sentenced
for all four murdered Ciuccis, then the prosecutor was permitted to
choose among three sentences for the same offense.
88. 8 IIl. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956). The Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam, 5-4
on the double jeopardy issue, but granted petitioner leave "to institute such further
proceedings as may be available to him for the purpose of substantiating the claim
that he was deprived of due process." 356 U.S. 571, 573 (1958).
89. Id. at 572.
90. Illinois is one of eleven states that permit jury sentencing. RumN, THE LAw or
CRm.NAL CoRREcrioN, Ch. 4 § 9 at 122 (1963).
91. The State's Attorney declared:
"The verdict is a moral injustice to society when a man is guilty of killing
his wife.
"To give a sentence like this, it's just like slapping him on the wrist."
Chicago American, March 19, 1954, p. 1 (4 star final ed.) cited in Brief for the Petitioner.
App. B, p. 43, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
92. 356 U.S. at 572.
93. Cuicci will be tried for the murder of the other children, said Irwin D. Block,.
acting States' Attorney.
"We are very disappointed, as we were in the first trial," Block declared. "We are
going to try the two other cases.
"Nothing short of the death penalty will satisfy the State and we hope to get a
jury which will realize the magnitude of this crime."
Chicago Daily News, July 29, 1954, p. 1 (Final Markets Red Streak ed.) cited in Brief
for the Petitioner, App. E, p. 51, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
94. 356 U.S. at 572.
95. E.g., note 103 infra. See generally RUBIN, THE LAw OF CIU.MAL CoRUECnO.,
Ch. 3 (1963).
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But Ciucci violated the double jeopardy policy against retrial after
conviction even if only one of the penalties was affected by evidence
of the related crimes. Suppose, for example, that the first jury sen-
tenced twenty years for murdering the wife without considering the
other murders. And suppose the second jury sentenced for murdering
the daughter in the context of the murder of wife and son. Suppose
further that the penalty was five years stiffer because of the wife-killing.
Ciucci would then have been sentenced twice for killing his wife:
twenty years by the first jury, and five by the second.
Prosecution after a conviction on overlapping offenses may raise
similar problems of double punishment. Consider, for example, the
case of Williams v. Oklahoma.09 After robbing a gas station, defendant
commandeered a car and driver in order to make a getaway. He
forced his captive to drive out of town, and killed him. Williams
pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life.07 He was then
prosecuted for the kidnapping, and pled guilty to an indictment
which made no mention of the murder.08 Prior to sentencing, how-
ever, the prosecutor, pursuant to Oklahoma law, 0 presented evidence
regarding the murder.100 The court sentenced defendant to death, and
the judge's statement made clear that the murder aggravated the pun-
ishment.10 The United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Court
reasoned that Williams had not been twice punished for the same of-
fense because the offenses were separately punishable in Oklahoma, 102
and that proper sentencing requires consideration of all the circum-
stances of the crime.103 The first argument begs the question. The sec-
96. 321 P.2d 990 (1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
97. 358 U.S. at 577-78.
98. No. 16911; INFORMATION FOR KIDNAPING-Filed December 17, 1956; State of
Oklahoma v. Edward Leon Williams; Transcript of the Record, pp. 16.17 (Print, pp. 3.4).
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 973, 974, 975 (1951).
100. Record, pp. 28-48 (Print, pp. 10-21), 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
101. The Court has been very deliberate in the matter of this case . . . investiga-
tion of the facts which have been alleged, which have been stated, and which you
admit were part of this crime which you have committed in Tulsa County, which
resulted in the murder . . . to which you have pled guilty and been sentenced in
Muskogee County, and which the court takes into consideration, that murder as
being a part and parcel of the crime which is here, as a continuing thing. It Is the
Court's opinion, that there has never been in the history of Tulsa, County, a more
brutal, vicious crime committed ...
Records, pp. 64-5 (Print, p. 29).
102. The Oklahoma statutes separately create and define the crimes of murder and
of kidnapping, and it is evident from their terms that, as held by the Oklahoma
court in this case, they create "separate and distinct offenses."
358 U.S. 576, 584-85.
103. In discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sentencing judge
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ond accurately describes the sentencing process, but leads to the oppo-
site conclusion. The second court clearly punished Williams for a
murder for which he had been previously convicted and punished.
Collateral Estoppel
These violations of double jeopardy policy occurred because the
courts followed vague and abstract offense-defining tests, instead of
using tools designed particularly to cure the evils of reprosecution.
For example, to solve the problems raised by reprosecution after an
acquittal, the courts might use the civil law doctrine of collateral
estoppel. 104  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation between the same
parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial.10, Some courts
are willing to apply the doctrine in criminal cases.100 But many of
these courts refuse to apply it unless it is mathematically certain that
the same issues were determined at the previous trial.107 Thus, in
is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and aggramting
circumstances involved in the crime.
Id. at 585.
104. For a general discussion of collateral estoppel, see lB Moore, FIERAL PAcricE.,
0.441-0.448; 2 FpEmA. , JuDGmEmNs Ch. XI 1322, (5th ed. 192); Scott, Collateral Estop-
pel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
105. The term res judicata is often used to denote two things in respect to the
effect of a valid, final judgment: (1) that such a judgment when rendered on the
merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those
in privy with them, upon the same claim or demand; and (2) that such a judgment
constitutes an estoppel, between the same parties or those in privity with them, as
to matters that were necessarily litigated and determined, although the claim or
demand in the subsequent action is different.
1B MooRE, 0.405[1], p. 621. Though both doctrines have as their objective judicial final-
ity, Moore concludes that the operational difference between them requires that different
terms be used for each. He uses "res judicata" to embrace only the first, "collateral
estoppel" the second.
In the civil law the suggested terminology is normally used, see, e.g., Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) but in the criminal law "res judicata" is
often used to describe collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.
2d 573 (1941); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 180 Ad. 266 (1935).
106. Regina v. Miles, L.R. 24 Q.B.D. 423 (1890) which the Supreme Court relied on in
United States v. Oppenhiemer, 242 US. 85 (1916). In the old English case of Rex v.
Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 583 (1776), a conviction in the Ecclesiastical
Court for ejactitation of marriage barred prosecution in another court for bigamy. See
also Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74
H.Rv. L. Ray. 1, at 29-31 for a discussion of the history of collateral estoppel in the
criminal law.
107. There are three reasons why mathematical certainty is nearly impossible: the
defence is usually a general denial; several theories of acquittal are usually offered in
the instructions; and the verdict is a general one. People v. Rogers, 102 Misc. 437, 170
N.Y. S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 184 App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. S. 451 (1st Dep't 1918),
aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 882 (1919). For instance, in State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d
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Hoag, the Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey Supreme Court's
ruling that the first jury might not have believed the defendant's alibi,
but might have acquitted on some element which he did not contest.108
The court would not look behind the general verdict to speculate
about which issues were decisive, however obvious this question ap.
peared from the record. Under this strict rendering of collateral estop-
pel, a second indictment will be barred only when it is certain that
some element necessary to conviction of the second offense has been
adjudicated in favor of the defendant at the first trial.100 But when-
ever there is substantial overlap between offenses, there is a significant
danger that a defendant tried separately on both will be twice required
to prove the same defense. In all these cases the current collateral
estoppel doctrine violates the double jeopardy policy against retrying
a man who has proved his innocence once.
A more realistic version of collateral estoppel is practiced in some
of the federal courts.110 In criminal cases, some courts examine the
234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940), the court allowed a subsequent prosecution for a robbery which
had been the underlying felony in a felony-murder charge of which defendant had al.
ready been acquitted, his sole defense having been an alibi. The court said,
It is not possible to determine whether the jurors returned a verdict of acquittal
because they credited the testimony in support of appellant's alibi, or for the
reason that they found the states evidence insufficient as to one or more essential
elements of the offense charged.
Id. at 241, 105 P.2d 67. See Note, 27 IowA L. REv. 649 (1942); Note, 25 CUI.-IaNT Rav.
243 (1947); Note, 47 COLUMi. L. R v. 679 (1947).
In addition some courts have held that unless the offenses are the same, no form of
res judicata (including collateral estoppel) is applicable. The confusion may arise be.
cause the courts in criminal cases use the generic term "res judicata," which in the
civil law, is used specifically to describe a doctrine applying only when the causes of
action are the same. Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924). See Luger,
supra note 40, at 330-31.
108. [W]e cannot say that the New Jersey Supreme Court exceeded constitutionally
permissible bounds in concluding that the jury might have acquitted petitioner at
the earlier trial because it did not believe that the victims of the robbery had been
put in fear, or that property had not been taken from them, or for other reasons
unrelated to the issue of 'identity.'
356 U.S. 464, 472.
109. Under the prevailing offense-defining test, which holds that offenses are not the
same if each has a distinct element, any pair of offenses that is not screened out as the
same by the test will not be affected by a version of collateral estoppel requiring
mathematical certainty, at least not where the verdict is a general one. It is always con.
ceivable that the jury's acquittal was based on reasonable doubt as to the first offense's
distinguishing element.
110. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). In Sealfon the Court considered
the record of the first trial and the instructions given to the jury that acquitted
the defendant of conspiracy. On the basis of this examination it concluded that the
acquittal for the conspiracy represented an adjudication which must have been
based on the belief that the defendant was innocent of the substantive offense as well.
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record of the previous prosecution, evaluate the pleading, defenses,
evidence and jury charge, and determine the issue upon which a ra-
tional jury must have rested its verdict."' This doctrine of "reasonable
speculation" saves a general verdict of acquittal from complete impo-
tence. But it leaves most complicated double jeopardy problems un-
solved. Whenever there is a substantial defense at the first trial on
two elements, only one of which is included in the second charge, no
amount of reasonable speculation will tell us whether the second trial
would relitigate issues settled at the first. Suppose, for example, the
defendant is prosecuted for uttering a false check. The prosecutor
alleges (1) that defendant presented and cashed the check, and (2) that
defendant knew it was forged because he forged it. The defenses are
(1) that defendant was not the person who cashed the check, and
(2) that he did not forge it. The jury acquits. Whether a subsequent
trial for forging the check would be collaterally estopped depends upon
whether the jury acquitted on the basis of the first or second defense;
and the determination will usually reflect guesswork rather than
reasonable speculation."2 If there were an acceptable way of taking
some of the guesswork out of the collateral estoppel device it would
successfully cure the evils of reprosecution after prior acquittal."13
Some state courts also have applied collateral estoppel in this more realistic way. People
v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (County CL 1912). Cf., Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) which held that inconsistent verdicts imposed at a single trial
should stand. Unfortunately, even in the jurisdictions which recognize collateral estoppel
in criminal cases, the courts frequently ignore the principle, or apply it inconsistently.
See, e.g., Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1931). See generally, Note, 27
TExAS L. REv. 231, 235 (1948). McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicata Applied to the
Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 WVAsr. L. Rav. 198 (1935).
111. See United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913-14 (1961). But collateral estoppel
may not be of constitutional dimension, for Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the court,
said in Hoag, "We entertain grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded
as a constitutional requirement." 356 US. 464, 471 (1958). However, he decided the case
on the ground that the Court could not overrule the state court determination of
"controverted or debatable factual issues." Ibid. For an interesting discussion suggesting
that collateral estoppel may have a constitutional basis and that it should have been
applied by the Supreme Court in Hoag, see Mayers and Yarbrough, supra note 106,
at 39-41.
112. This difficulty may also arise when, at the first trial, the acquitted defendant
pleaded inconsistent defenses, one of which would also acquit on the subsequent charge.
Autrefois Acquit and Issue Estoppel CXIV L.J. (No. 5143) 547-50 (IV4). See also Mayers
and Yarbrough, supra note 106, at 1-3, 41-3, for a discussion of United States v. May-
bury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960) where the judge rendered inconsistent verdicts in a
forging-uttering case.
113. While special interrogatories would divulge some of the mystery behind a general
verdict and make collateral estoppel a potent, workable doctrine of the criminal law,
they would probably hamper the jury in its performance of what many commentators
believe to be its justifying function, tempering the rigors of harsh or unpopular laws
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However, the device would be totally inadequate as a tool for the two
other double jeopardy policies. First, when the defendant has been
convicted previously, presumably none of the defenses succeeded at
the first trial, and it would be contrary to his interest to bar relitigation
of these issues.1 4 Second, collateral estoppel frequently will not pre-
vent reprosecution which violates double jeopardy's anti-harassment
policy. Suppose, for example, in the uttering-forging case, defendant
raised only the first defense in a prosecution for uttering. An acquittal
could not possibly collaterally estop a subsequent prosecution for forg-
ing. But separate prosecution might still be arbitrary and burdensome.
We must look further, then, to a solution which better implements the
policy against harassment.
Harassment
Harassment is not a synonym for inconvenience. All repeated prose-
cutions distress defendants." 5 Harassment, at least in double jeopardy
law, involves misconduct by the prosecutor as well as hardship to the
defendant. The mistrial cases show that a second prosecution will be
deemed harassing when it is not absolutely necessary-when the first
trial could have been determinative but for illegitimate prosecutorial
behavior.
Retrial following discharge of a jury is prohibited unless the mistrial
was granted with the defendant's consent'" or out of manifest neces-
with the sympathy of the community. The jury would no longer be able to render a
compromise verdict without exhibiting the inconsistency of its determinations, and this
it might be reluctant to do. "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law In its
actual trial administration." Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Art. L. IRav.
12, 18 (1910); United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d CIr. 1960). For a dis.
cussion of special verdicts and special interrogatories in civil law cases, see generally,
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 7.15, at 293 (1965).
114. Where there is a conviction, the general verdict is not inscrutable; every essential
element has been determined against the defendant. While some state courts have held
that adverse determinations of issues litigated at the first trial are binding on the
defendant at the second, Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25 (1869), dicta In more
recent federal decisions indicate that the defendant may have a constitutional right to
a trial before the immediate jury on every issue raised in the second prosecution. United
States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); United States v. DeAngelo, 138
F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943).
115. In fact two of the most frequently occurring classes of cases where a second
prosecution is permitted, (1) following a hung jury, and (2) following reversal of a
conviction, probably involve greater inconvenience to the defendant than most forms
of mistrials because in these instances the first trial is a complete one.
116. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963); Raslich v. Bannan, 273 F.2d
420 (6th Cir. 1959). Though sometimes the defendant's consent will be implied from his
failure to object, Harlan v. State, 190 Ind. 322, 130 N.E. 413 (1921), usually such silence
is not held to constitute consent, and the defendant is not deemed to have waived his
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sity.117 The courts have recognized necessity when there is a breakdown
of judicial machinery'-s-when the first jury is hung,1 " a juror is
disqualified, 20 the trial judge dies,' or war doses the courts. - But
the prosecutor's intentional precipitation of a mistrial bars reprose-
cution.m He may not, without prejudice, have the jury discharged
because it is unsympathetic, or because he has poorly prepared his
case. 24 Thus double jeopardy forbids the prosecutor to use the first
double jeopardy objection to a trial following such mistrial. See, e.g., United States v.
Himmelfarb, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 US. 860 (1949); Commonwealth
v. Gray, 249 Ky. 36, 60 S.W.2d 133 (1933). There is frequently considerable difficulty in
determining whether the defendant has consented.
117. The classic case is United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). where
Mr. Justice Story said:
[t]he law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public
justice would otherwise be defeated.
Although the Supreme Court has refused to extend the federal mistrial rule to the states,
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 US. 424 (1952), most states have a standard similar to
the federal one. Id. at 436-37 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson); Comm. v.
Fitzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109, 15 At. 466 (1888); People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467, 478 (1869) (and
cases cited). See also, 2 WHARTON, CanmNAL PROCEDURE (10th ed.), §§ 1427-57.
118. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. United States v. Perez, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); Ex parte Mclaughlin, 41
Cal. 211, 219 (1871).
120. E.g., Simmons v. United States, 142 US. 148 (1891).
121 Freeman v. United States, 237 Fed. 815 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Bigelow,
14 D.C: 393, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1884) (dictum).
122. Wade v. Hunter, 336 US. 684 (1949).
123. In the recent case of Downum v. United States, 372 US. 734 (1963), the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction secured following a mistrial on the same charges. The first
trial was terminated bemuse a government witness, who was to testify on two of the
six counts charged in the indictment, was not present when the trial was to begin. The
defendant moved to dismiss the two counts for lack of prosecution. His motion was
denied and over his objections the judge discharged the jury. Two days later he was
reprosecuted before a different jury, and, after his plea of double jeopardy was denied
he was convicted. The appellate court affirmed, 300 F.2d 137. Justice Clark in his disset
interpreted the majority as holding that the inadvertent as well as the intentional
precipitation of a mistrial will bar reprosecution. (Id. at 739). But the majority opinion may
simply stand for the proposition that where the actions of the state may have been de-
signed to deprive the defendant of a determination by the initial jury and were not
simply the result of negligence, doubts will be resolved "in favor of the liberty of the
citizen, rather than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial
discretion." Id. at 738.
The decision has been criticized on the grounds that it may result in prejudice to
the defendant. Judges will now be reluctant to declare mistrials even where desirable
since they know retrial will not be permitted. Instead, the judge will try to elicit the
defendant's consent to a termination and if refused may allow the trial to proceed. In
this case the defendant faces, at best, reprosecution following a reversal on appeal, and at
worst, affirmance of his conviction. Note, 77 HKAv. L. Rv. 1272, 1279 (1964).
124. This [the rule that reprosecution following a mistrial not required by manifest
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proceeding as a trial run of his case or as an opportunity to test and
select his jury.
These mistrial cases establish a definition of harassment which
should apply also to reprosecution on related offenses. Reprosecution
burdens and disadvantages the defendant more after he has completed
a full first trial than if it ends prematurely.12r And motives which are
illegitimate bases for reprosecution after a mistrial are no more savory
in the multiple offense context. Harassment should be found whenever
the prosecutor reprosecutes without legitimate justification. The
reprosecution should be prohibited, and the prosecutor who wants to
prosecute on more than one count should be told that he must join
all the counts at the first trial, or forfeit those which he might have
joined.
The chief justification offered for reprosecuting on reserved counts
after an acquittal is that there was a "mistake" prejudicial to the state
at the first trial. 126 "Mistake" may signify any of the three kinds of
disadvantage to the state: (1) the first jury was sympathetic to defend-
ant; (2) the first acquittal was based on a "technicality"; (3) the judge
erred against the state.
Jury sympathy is no more proper a basis for reserving counts than
for precipitating a mistrial. Sympathy is hard to distinguish from jury
prerogative; and, in any case, unreasoning compassion is one of the
selling points of the jury system.127 The right to a jury trial is defeated
if the prosecutor has his pick of two juries.
necessity will not be permitted] prevents a prosecutor or judge from subjecting a
defendant to a second prosecution by discontinuing the trial when it appears that
the jury might not convict.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). See also Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
125. A complete trial will generally consume more of the defendant's time and money
than will an aborted one. In addition it will force him to divulge more of his case
while enabling the prosecutor to have a trial run. On the other hand, defendant's knowl.
edge of the government's case does not seem to affect adversely its capacity to secure con-
victions. The Problems of Long Criminal Trials, 34 F.R.D. 155, 161 (1964). Finally, If
there is a substantial delay between trials, the defendant may incur the financial and
psychological hardship of imprisonment while waiting trial.
126. Among those who have argued that the state ought to be permitted an appeal
to correct prejudicial errors at the first trial are: Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904); ALI, ADMIN. OF ClUM. LAw:
DouBLE JEOPARDY § 13 (1932); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy,
58 YALE L.J. 513, 542-43 (1949); Note, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 362-63 (1956); Mayers and Yar-
brough, supra note 106, at 13-16; Jones, What Constitutes Double Jeopardy?, 88 J. Caim.
L., C. & P.S. 379, 387 (1947). See generally Note, 24 MINN. L. REY. 522 (1940).
127. Jury sympathy and jury compromise have long been recognized and accepted
as inherent in the jury system. "The justices seem to feel that if they analyzed the
verdict they would miss the very thing for which they are looking, the opinion of the
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A "technical acquittal" can never justify reprosecution on a related
offense. If the technicality is such that we wish to allow the prosecutor
to correct it at a subsequent trial, we should allow him to reprosecute
on the same offense. For example, the present law is that when the de-
fendant is acquitted because the prosecutor brought the case in the
wrong jurisdiction, reprosecution for the same offense is allowed in
the correct jurisdiction.38 However, when the technicality is such that
country." 2 PoLLAcK AND fAmrAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAiw 624 (2d ed. 1905). In Homing
v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920), Mr. Justice Holmes acknowledged that
"... the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact."
Id. at 138. In United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960), Judge Friendly
recognized that this power to mitigate punishment through inconsistent verdicts would
be frequently exercised so long as the vogue for repetitious multiple count indictments
continue, in order "to prevent the punishment from getting too far out of line with
the crime." Id. at 902. Other courts, while granting that juries have the power to
render compromise verdicts, view the exercise of such power as illegitimate. Steckler
v. United States, 7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1925).
128. United States v. Ball, 163 US. 662, 669 (1895) (dictum); Johnsen v. United States,
41 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 US. 864 (1930); Paulson v. People, 195 111. 507
(1902); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). Though prosecu-
tion brought in the wrong jurisdiction may inconvenience the defendant, see note 3,
supra, such an error will generally be discovered early in the proceeding. Society's
interest in bringing alleged offenders to trial may require that the rule remain as it is.
Nevertheless the rule that reprosecution is permitted following an acquittal on the merits
in the wrong jurisdiction, Commonwealth v. Peters, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 387, 397 (1847),
undermines double jeopardy objectives. If retrial in such cases is barred, and the defendant
permitted to demand that the trial continue even if in the wrong jurisdiction, then the
state could not prosecute in the wrong jurisdiction to vex the defendant, for it could
not thereby establish a valid conviction, but would be bound by an acquittal. Since the
state was responsible for choosing the wrong jurisdiction, it should bear the risk of an
unfavorable verdict where trial proceeds on the merits. See Note, 77 H~Av. L REV.
1272, 1282 (1964).
Reprosecution is also permitted following a conviction in the wrong jurisdiction.
United States v. Tyler, 15 F.2d 207 (D. Del. 1926); State v. Rountree, 127 S.C. 261
(1924). Even where part of the sentence has been served. Ogle v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 219
(1901). If reprosection is to be permitted in such cases, certainly the portion of the
first sentence which has been served should be credited and deducted from any new
sentence imposed.
There are two other categories of cases where eprosecution on the same offense is
permitted. First, where a defective indictment or information is dismissed before the
jury is impanelled or an indictment or information that fails to allege a crime is dis-
missed any time during the proceedings, and second, where the verdict is secured
through fraud or collusion. Though defective indictments can be purposely used to
oppress, see note 3, supra, society's interest in bringing the accused to trial should not be
negated because of what may only be carelessness. Instead the prosecutor should, where
the constitution permits, be able to amend his indictment or information at the time
the defect is noticed. In this way the prosecutor will not be able to persecute by indict-
ments, but will be able to correct oversights at little or no cost to the defendant. If the
amendments raise problems of fair notice to the accused, a continuance should be
permitted. For a discussion advocating liberalized amendment procedures, see Kirch.
heimer, supra note 126, at 534-39.
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the prosecutor cannot reprosecute for the same offense, he should not
be allowed to reprosecute on a related offense either.
The most common argument for allowing reprosecution on related
offenses is that the judge may have erred against the state at the first
trial. Since the prosecutor cannot appeal in the federal system and in
most states, the argument runs, he must have the option to "correct"
the error by prosecuting on reserved counts.120 The policy premise that
the state's interest requires some sort of appeal may or may not be
sound. The logic is not. If we refuse to permit the state to correct
errors properly, we should not permit it to correct them deviously.
Offense-splitting allows the prosecutor to decide whether he was
defeated fairly. 30 A prosecutor who alleges error as a basis for charg-
ing a second offense should, at the least, be required to prove error
to the court before the second proceeding. But even this procedure
would be irrational. The state's interest in reprosecuting to correct
error is independent of the number of offenses which can be concocted
from the defendant's behavior. If the interest is to be recognized at
all the state should be permitted to appeal all cases. Not only would
the decision to retry be made visible, but the state would be permitted
to prosecute for the proper offense rather than an incidental and prob-
ably less serious one. We should prefer changing the Constitution, if
necessary, to circumventing it by practices more arbitrary than it
forbids.131
Where the defect is not noticed, and there is an acquittal on the merits, retrial should
be barred since in such cases the defect will have been irrelevant to the adjudication of
innocence. This rule has been enacted by statute in about half the states and is judicially
recognized in most others. See ALI (1932), at 153-55.
Where the adjudication is secured by the fraud of the defendant, none of the double
jeopardy policies are defeated by reprosecution for the same offense and It should be
permitted, as it generally is. State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 SXE.2d 701 (1951); Smith
v. State, 219 Miss. 741, 69 So. 2d 837 (1954); ALI (1932) at 160-62.
129. Generally it is suggested that reprosecution on related counts should be barred,
but not until a procedure of state appeals to correct error is established. See sources
cited in note 126, supra. See also, Steffen, Concerning Double Jeopardy and the New
Rules, 7 FED. B.J. 86 (1945); Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 735, 758.59 (1959).
130. What little empirical evidence there is available on reserving counts and re-
prosecuting on them, indicates that the practice is rare. The evidence also indicates
that such decisions are based on unilateral determinations by the prosecutor or police
that the defendant was guilty, and have little to do with technical aquittals.
Several assistant prosecuting attorneys stated that the prosecutor stands ready to
bring a second charge if a defendant is acquitted on the first and the prosecutor
and the police are convinced of the defendant's guilt, but all acknowledged that
resort to this practice is very rare.
The Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, 3 AMERICAN BAR FOONDA.
TION 611 (Pilot Project Report) [cited hereafter as AMEUCAN BAR FOUNDATION]; see also
5 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 111-57.
131. It has been suggested that the decision in Kepner disallowing appeals by the
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For similar reasons, reprosecution on reserved counts after convic-
tion is illegitimate. A second prosecution cannot be excused as an
attempt to secure a "fairer" sentence because the second trial does not,
in fact, review the first sentence. Nor can reprosecution be justified
because the first trial was for a less serious offense and the prosecutor
feels the defendant should be penalized for the more serious offense.
Nothing prevented the prosecutor from trying the more serious charge
first.132
The prosecutor might wish to try counts separately in order to avoid
the possibility that the jury will compromise by convicting for the
less serious count. But compromise is a justifying purpose of the jury
system.133 Since our law allows the prosecutor to grant leniency by
charging a lesser count, surely it is proper for the jury to have the
same option. In any event, there is no reason to let the prosecutor
choose joinder or severance to suit his tactical advantage.
Other reasons for reprosecution are even more illicit. Prosecutors
sometimes reserve counts to threaten or punish uncooperative defend-
federal government may not have been a constitutional one, but rather a decision based
on legislative intent; if this is correct, a statute authorizing state appeals might not be
unconstitutional. 65 YALE LJ. 339, 362-63 (1956). Generally, however, even those ad-
vocating state appeals admit that Kepner was a constitutional decision and that.
"Realistically, it must be conceded that stare decisis will no doubt prevent a broad
reinterpretation of the fifth amendment from ever taking place." Mayers and Yarbrough,
op. cit. supra note 106, at 15.
Appeals by the states, however, have been held not to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Palko v. Connecticut, 202 US. 319 (1937). There are presently three states that
permit state appeals. In two of them, Connecticut and Vermont, statutes permitting
such appeals were held not to violate the double jeopardy prohibition which was
recognized as part of their common law. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, -0 Adt. 1110 (1894);
State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Ad. 23 (1918). A similar statute in Wisconsin (Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 918.12(l)(d) (1958)) was held not to violate that state's constitutional provision
prohibiting double jeopardy (Wis. Const. art I, § 8), State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10
N.W.2d 117 (1943). See generally ORaFmm, CmutNAL APPE.rs m AstmucA 55-76 (1939).
122. Where one act constitutes two offenses, and the defendant is first tried for one
of them in a court which does not have jurisdiction over the other offense, a subsequent
prosecution in a court having such jurisdiction has sometimes been permitted, State v.
Goodson, 54 N.M. 184, 217 P.2d 262 (1950), and has sometimes been prohibited, State
v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951). By requiring joinder of such causes for trial
before the court having jurisdiction over both, the burden on such courts will not be
significantly increased since a trial on both offenses will be virtually identical to a trial
on just one.
A comparable problem arises where the defendant has been tried for an offense such
as assault, but subsequent events alter the nature of the offense, i.e., the victim dies of
injuries inflicted during the assault. A subsequent trial for manslaughter should not be
permitted unless the trial for assault resulted in a conviction. If the defendant is then
convicted of manslaughter the unserved segment of his sentence for assault should be
vacated and the segment already served should be credited toward his sentence for
manslaughter.
122. See note 127 supra.
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ants,134 and in highly publicized cases to increase the possibility of
conviction or exercise control over the punishment.'85 But neither the
cooperativeness of the defendant nor the notoriety of the crime is a
legitimate reason to bully the accused. Double jeopardy was designed
to thwart government tyranny. A disgruntled prosecutor or an in-
flamed democracy can be just as tyrannical as a monarch.
Proliferating offenses for reprosecution also may give the prosecutor
considerable control over plea bargaining and the parole process.
When reprosecution is the trump in plea bargaining, the defendant
faces not only the possibility of increased punishment, but an increased
likelihood of conviction if he refuses the bargain. And even if the
prosecutor does not intend to bring a second proceeding, he may
prejudice the convicted defendant's parole eligibility by "holding
open" related counts. 8 6 Neither of these advantages to the prosecutor
justify allowing him to withhold counts from the first trial for pos-
sible reprosecution. If for some reason it is thought beneficial to grant
the prosecutor more power over plea bargaining and parole, the power
should be granted directly.
Constitutionally Compelled Joinder
Dismissing these invalid reasons for reprosecution leaves the prose-
cutor with only two legitimate objections to compulsory joinder 87
134. One case was observed in which the assistant district attorney stated If the
defendant did not cooperate in the making of restitution that he would hold some
warrants open until a later time and would subsequently prosecute him for the ad-
ditional offenses.
5 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 111-57.
However, this defendant "reneged on his "deal" with the sheriff's department and
the sheriff's department is now going to file two extra charges against him.
6 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 133.
135. E.g., People v. Martinis, 46 Misc. 2d 1066, 261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1965); Cuiccl v. Illinois,
356 U.S. 571 (1958).
136. It was indicated, however, that occasionally a case is preserved by filing a
complaint concerning it alone, while a later case is tried on another complaint
charging the later case alone. In that way a twofold purpose is served . . . secondly,
that where a case is filed and pending, it constitutes a hold on a convicted
defendant, thereby preventing later parole.
6 AMaUEscAN BAR FOUNDATION 133. See also 9 FED. PROB. 1 (Issue 3, 1945) and note 69 supra.
137. This does not mean that the prosecutor must charge all known offenses, but
only that if he is ever going to charge them, he must do so at a single trial.
Required joinder of related offenses is suggested in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1956), which reads as follows:
Offenses must be prosecuted in a single prosecution when:
(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct; or (b) the offenses are based on a
series of acts or omissions motivated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal
objective, and necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of that objective; or
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If the offenses are so complicated that the jury will confuse them,
then joinder should not be required. This objection is valid in par-
ticular cases and must be recognized by any compulsory joinder rule.
Further, there may be cases in which joinder would not confuse the
jury, but in which the prosecutor would be prejudiced. For example,
suppose a defendant is charged with a murder committed on May 15,
and a robbery committed on Nov. 15. An argument can be made that
these two offenses are so dissimilar that no jury would confuse evidence
about each. But since very little evidence will overlap, the prosecutor
will have to prepare a double case if he is required to join the counts.
Time pressures necessitate that the prosecutor not be required to do
double work for one trial. Also the defendant will gain very little if
joinder is required since the trial on two counts will probably be al-
most as long as twro separate trials.
If the prosecutor prevails on either of his two legitimate objections,
and he is allowed to reprosecute, principles of collateral estoppel
should apply. If the first trial results in an acquittal, double jeopardy
should preclude relitigation of issues which were resolved; and the
second court should speculate about the probable basis of the first
acquittal, and perhaps even make reasonable presumptions in favor
of the defendant. If the first trial results in conviction and the second
trial results in acquittal, the court should speculate about the grounds
of the second verdict. If it can be inferred that the second jury found
an issue crucial to the defense of both charges in favor of the defendant,
the first conviction should be vacated. Of course the prosecutor will
usually be satisfied after one conviction. If, however, he wants to
cumulate punishment he must take the chance that the first conviction
will be vacated.
(c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a common
purpose or plan and which result in the repeated commission of the same offense
or affect the same person or the same persons or the property thereof.
The tentative draft 5 proposal is discussed and commended in Knowlton, Criminal Law
and Procedure, 11 RuT. L. REV. 71, 88-95 (1956).
The ALI MfoDEL PENAL CODE, Proposed Official Draft (1962) § 1.07(2). requires joinder
only of offenses which are based on the same conduct or arise from the same criminal
episode.
Iinois has enacted a version of the Model Act proposal in its revised statute ILL.
ANN. STAT., ch. 38, § 3.3 (Smith-Hurd 1961). Though the section may mean only that
where one act constitutes several offenses, these must be joined, the committee comments
following this section definitely indicate that joinder is to be required of all offenses
arising from the same conduct.
Professor Dession also proposed required joinder in similar situations. Dession, Final
Draft of the Code of Correction for Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J. 1050, 1115 (1962). Like
most other authors who have suggested required joinder, he also provides for appeals
by the state. Id. at 1116.
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As a general matter, though, the proposed compulsory joinder rule
will probably not prejudice the state. Joinder is permitted in almost
all jurisdictions, 138 it has become virtually automatic in many, and it
is compulsory, under certain circumstances, in a few.18 9 The little
empirical evidence available indicates that prosecutors will generally
join their two or three best counts for a single trial, and will not
prosecute for spun-out offenses after either an acquittal or convic-
tion. 40 This evidence, along with the many joinder cases, indicates
that joinder has not been thought prejudicial to the state. Since joinder
has proven workable and not prejudicial to the state, there is no legiti-
mate reason to permit a prosecutor to reserve for reprosecution counts
which could have been joined. A second prosecution, with only the
two exceptions, constitutes harassment and should be barred by double
jeopardy.
138. See, e.g., IED. R. CuM. P. 8; N.Y. CODE Criai. Paoc. § 279; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 954. Joinder need not be authorized by statute to be permitted. Price v. State, 127
Iowa 301, 103 N.W. 195 (1905). Virtually all states permit joinder of offenses which arise
from one course of conduct and about one third of the states permit it where the
offenses are similar, even if committed on separate occasions. Commentators, however,
have generally been critical of similar offense joinder. Note, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 560 n.39
(1965). But if the defendant prefers joinder in such cases, and the state cannot legitimately
object, there seems no reason why it should not be permitted. The defendant, however,
will usually prefer severance, and, if he can show probable prejudice, it should be
granted. Even if the defendant secures severance, an acquittal at the first trial should
be given reasonable estoppel effect.
139. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch 38, § 3-3 (Smith & Hurd 1961) The purpose of the statute
are discussed in People v. Mullenhoff, 52 111. App. 2d 369, 202 N.E.2d 128 (1964).
140. When the criminal act of the defendant gives the county attorney one or
more alternatives in selecting the nature of the charge, lie will select the charge
which is easiest to prove.
6 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 129.
If a defendant, by an act, commits what might be two felonies .... They would
try only one, however, and if the defendant is convicted, they would forget the
other charge. If the defendant was acquitted, they would probably also forget the
other charge unless they felt aggrieved by the decision.
3 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 611.
It is the policy of the district attorney's office to charge the multiple offender with
more than one offense. Common practice limits the number of charges to two
regardless of the number of offenses which the defendant may have committed..
5 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 11155.
Those offenses will be charged which are the best in the sense that they are the
most aggravated, carry the higest penalty, and are cases where the evidence Is most
sufficient including availability of witnesses or victims who are willing to testify.
. . . Though the police indicated that holding some charges back makes It possible
to prosecute a person previously acquitted, it is clear that this would be a most
unusual practice and no member of the police department or the district attorney's




Of course the defendant might claim legitimately that compulsory
joinder would prejudice him. In these cases, severance should be
granted, and the prosecutor should be allowed to reprosecute on the
severed count. Compulsory joinder, at least when the offenses overlap,
will generally not prejudice the defendant. He loses no protection
against the introduction of evidence about the related counts, since
evidence of related crimes would be admissible even in separate
trials? 41 Nor would joinder seriously trim the defendant's fifth amend-
ment rights when the counts related to the same transaction. Joinder
would preclude the defendant from choosing to testify on only one
of the counts-he must talk about all or none. But even at separate
trials, this choice would be available only if the prosecutor decided
to prosecute first on the count about which the defendant wished to
be silent. If the defendant were first tried on the count about which
he wanted to talk, the prosecutor could force him to testify about the
entire transaction, and therefore about the second count. This testi-
mony would be admissible at the second trial.14
Conceivably the defendant may be prejudiced in subtle ways because
of factors peculiar to required joinder. Now, a prosecutor who is pri-
marily interested in convicting rather than piling up sentences, may
charge only his best offense, knowing that if it fails he has others in
store. Limiting him to but one crack at the defendant may force him
to join all conceivable offenses, resulting in several convictions rather
than one. But this is an unlikely hypothesis. Since the offenses are
closely enough related to require joinder, the defense will generally
be relevant to all of them. The prosecutor will realize that charging
all of the counts will not substantially increase the probability of con-
viction, and if he were interested in but one conviction he would
probably continue to charge only his best counts. The American Bar
141. Under the other crimes rule, evidence relating to the whole transaction is ad-
missible even at a trial for an offense constituting only a part of it. See McCorcwi
EvmENcE § 157 (1954); 1 IWsrOPE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3d ed. 1940). See generally
Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Mfae frs, 70 YALz hJ.
763 (1961); Note, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 561 (1965).
142. Note, 74 YALE LJ. 553, 561 (1965); McConufncx, EvmENcE § 230 (1954); 4 Wic-
moEE, EViDENCE § 1066 (3d ed. 1940); see 5 WxmMORE, EvmENc § 1414 (3d ed. 1940). In
fact, separate trials may prejudice the defendant, for if he is convicted at the first
trial and wishes to testify at the second, evidence of the conviction is admissible to
impeach his testimony. 3 WIGMoRE § 926 (3d ed. 1940); McConucr § 43 (1954). Although
both authors contend that only prior convictions of crimes which show a tendency
to lie, such as perjury or false pretenses, ought to be admitted to impeach the defendant's
testimony, virtually all jurisdictions admit evidence of all prior convictions to impeach.
See discussion of Rule 21 of the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence in McConsucx
at § 50.
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Foundation project indicates that prosecutors will not amass more
counts under a required joinder rule than when joinder is permis-
sive. 43 Except in those rare cases, then, in which the defendant or
the prosecutor can prove prejudice, double jeopardy law should deem
offenses the same when they could have been prosecuted at a single
trial. 44
The Civil Law Analogy
The civil law provides a helpful analog in its doctrine of res judicata,
which, like our proposed rule, insists on some measure of compulsory
joinder. At one time the law of res judicata resembled the modern
law of double jeopardy. But res judicata matured in a way that double
jeopardy must now follow. Since res judicata bars all further action
on a litigated claim, its effectiveness depends on the meaning given
"claim." A claim can be defined either by the legal theories it asserts,
or by the set of facts it covers.14r The civil law is progressing towards
a broad factual definition; 146 but the prevailing criminal law test holds
claims to be different whenever they involve even slightly distin-
guishable issues of fact or law. 147 Historically, the narrow conception
143. Even in Kansas, where the prosecutors interpret KAN. GEN. STAr ANN. § 67-1449
(1949) as requiring joinder of all known counts,
When the criminal act of the defendant gives the county attorney one or more
alternatives in selecting the nature of the charge, he will select the charge which
is easiest to prove.
6 AmERiCAN BAR FOUNDATION 129.
144. Compulsory joinder will also promote consistent and rational sentencing. One
sentencer, judge or jury, will evaluate all the conduct, rather than several sentencers
evaluating different aspects of it.
145. 1B MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrna 0.410[l], at 1157-60 (2d ed. 1965). JAbIEs, ClvIL
PROcEDURE, § 11.10, at 552-57 (1965).
146. The emphasis which, in earlier times, was upon forms, rather than upon
causes, of action, is fast disappearing if it has not already disappeared, giving place
to emphasis upon the facts which when pleaded and proved in support of a claimed
right, will entitle claimant to relief.
Wilson Express Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 109 F.2d 623, 627 (5th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940);
A reading of the early cases as compared with recent ones makes it clear that the
meaning of "cause of action" for res judicata purposes is much broader today than
it was earlier.
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 2.06[6] at 378-88 (2d cd. 1964);
lB MooRE, 0A10[1] & [2], at 1151-84 (2d ed. 1965);
Wherever there will be a large overlap of issues or evidence if two trials are held,
it is wasteful to society and harassing to the adversary to have more than one, and
there should be no more than one unless there is some very good reason.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.10, at 555 (1965).
147. See notes 41-53, supra, and accompanying text.
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of "claim" was based on modes of thinking now antiquated. And the
obstinacies of procedure which helped maintain that narrow concep-
tion have since largely disappeared from both civil and criminal law.
At common law a claim or cause of action was a set of facts which
would support a judgment under a particular writ. "The emphasis
was upon forms of action rather than 'causes of action.' "148 One set of
facts could be shuffled to fit into several groupings each of which would
support an appropriate writ.149 Since forms of action could not be
joined 50 a plaintiff who bungled the technicalities of pleading on a
particular writ would be out of court.151 But because suit on a different
writ was not barred by res judicata, he was often assured of another
opportunity for a trial on the merits.
Under modem procedures, most technical pleading requirements
have been dismantled, and the plaintiff can be quite certain of a trial
on the merits on his first try. -52 Thus he is now required to join all
facets of his claim and he may not bring a second suit to redress the
same grievance under a different legal theory. The definition of "claim"
or "cause of action" has changed to allow res judicata to implement
this functional rule of joinder. A cause of action, once defined as a
particular writ or legal theory, or as all claims arising from the breach
of a single duty (conceptually a single "wrong") is now by the pre-
ferred view, simply that set of facts which can conveniently be litigated
at one trial.153
The parallel to the criminal process is striking-up to the point
148. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE 206[2], at 360 (2d ed. 1965).
149. The cause of action was not identical with the facts which occurrence had
grouped together. Such a segment of life often produced several causes of action ....
Ibid.
150. Joinder was permitted on the basis of legal similarity between the actions, not
on factual similarity.
Claims which arose out of the very same occurrence could not be joined if they
required different forms of action for their redress.
JAmEs, CIvIL PRocEDuRE § 10.2, at 447 (1965).
151. The inquiry was not whether plaintiff should recover under the law of the
land, but whether he had proved a case in trespass, or in covenant, or in whatever
form of action he had brought. If not, he lost the case, whatever the merits of it were.
Id., § 1.3, at 10.
152. . . . it was inevitable that federal procedure along with substantially all
other modem systems should eventually jettison the unseemly practice of turning
a suitor out of court because he had come in at the wrong door...
2 Mooan 2.05, at 331 (2d ed. 1965).
153. Moore suggests we adopt
the concept of one procedural cause of action for a set of operative facts whid
group themselves together conveniently for trial....
2 Moom 2.06[3], at 361 (2d ed. 1965).
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where the civil law straightens out leaving its criminal twin twisted
in a categorical maze. Although today only a connoisseur can discrimi-
nate between debt and assumpsit, many jurisdictions still consider
offenses different if they are based on different legal theories. Thus
possession and transportation of moonshine liquor are considered
separate "causes of action" even though they are merely alternative
means of catching the same group of offenders.154 Offenses, as well as
causes of action, may be distinguished when they involve separate
"wrongs," even if the wrongs arise from exactly the same conduct of
the defendant-as, for example, rape and incest1 5 Joinder is no longer
prohibited,15 6 and an alternative writ or an alternative offense is no
longer necessary to assure the prosecutor of a chance for a trial on the
merits. 157 Today there is no reason why counts which could conve-
niently be tried together should be severable at the prosecutor's option.
The criminal law test should be simple and functional, like the emerg-
ing civil doctrine-joinder should be required of offenses which sub-
stantially overlap, unless likely prejudice is shown.
The rule of joinder does not lend itself to mechanical tests. But
recurrent factual patterns will emerge,'58 allowing the court to deter-
mine in advance whether reprosecution should be barred. When the
plea is made, the court should compare the record of the first proceed-
ing with the second indictment. If the indictment does not provide
adequate information for the judge to decide whether or not the second
prosecution should be barred, the prosecutor should be required to
submit to the court a more detailed statement of his case. Of course,
greater certainty could be achieved if the second trial were actually
held. But double jeopardy should aim at preventing, not merely cen-
154. State v. Peck, 146 Wash. 101, 261 Pac. 779 (1927); see notes 239-41 infra and accom-
panying text.
155. State v. Learned, 73 Kan. 328, 85 Pac. 293 (1906).
156. At common law, felonies could not be tried together. See note 217, infra. But
joinder is now permitted in virtually all jurisdictions. See note 138, supra.
157. Liberalization in the specificity required in an indictment and the amendment
of indictments have made variance between allegation and proof less likely. In addition,
variance is permitted if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1935); See Goldstein, supra note 55, at 1178-80 for a
critical discussion of these procedural reforms. Also the multiple count indictment may
charge a crime in a variety of forms in order to avoid fatal variance of the evidence.
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 223 (1952). No longer is
such an indictment considered "bad for duplicity."
158. There are only a limited number of ways in which multiple offenses can be
committed. Just as in the civil law, recurring kinds of fact situations will eventually yield
helpful criteria for deciding when joinder should be required. See JANIES, CIVIL PRocrutn
§ 11.10, at 554 (1965).
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suring, needless reprosecution. In difficult cases the judge will have to
decide, without rules or precedent, whether the offense could conve-
niently have been tried at once. But this is a typical criterion for judicial
discretion. Under current rules of federal criminal procedure the judge
must decide whether severance is "in the interest of justice" after the
prosecutor has joined counts.' 59 A constitutional rule of joinder would
apply the same test, but shift the burden when the prosecutor seeks
multiple trials on kindred counts.160
MULTIPLE CONVICTION AND PUNISHMENT AT A SINGLE TRIAL
The urge to punish cumulatively'0 ' is not of recent birth. In 1305,
when Edward I sat upon the throne of England, the notorious traitors
159. FED. R. Cram. P. 14.
160. Actually, the joinder test is not entirely dissimilar to some formulations of the
backwards same evidence test. Thus, for example, in State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 503
(1895), the court held that the second proceeding would be barred if the facts which
might have been proved under the first indictment would iarrant a conviction of the
second offense. The court expressly held that the evidence which the prosecutor chose
to offer at the first proceeding was not determinative, but rather that he was estopped
from bringing a subsequent proceeding upon evidence which he might have offered at
the first trial. The shortcoming of this approach is that it depends upon the manner
in which the prosecutor frames the first indictment, whereas the joinder requirement
does not permit him to ftme an unnecessarily narrow first indictment.
161. Today, cumulative punishment may take many different forms. The multiple
offender may be sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, to cumulative penalties,
(including fines, e.g., Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916)). or to a tingle
penalty greater than that to which the criminal might have been sentenced for a single
offense but less than to which he might have been cumulatively sentenced. The aggre-
gate penalty technique, which does not keep the punishment for each offense distinct.
is used in the federal system, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 276 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1960)
(permitted but disapproved); but contra see, e.g., United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617
(3d Cir. 1954). It is permissible in the District of Columbia, Scott v. District of Columbia,
122 A.2d 579 (fun. Ct. App. 1956); Maryland, Vandergrift v. State, 226 Md. 38, 171 A2d
713 (1960); New York, People v. Luciano, 227 N.Y. 348 (1938). It is not permissible in
Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See generally 91 A.L.R.2d 511 (1963).
Such sentences, although disapproved by a few courts, have generally been upheld so
long as the aggregate does not exceed the total which the court could have imposed
consecutively. If the court does not specify, multiple sentences are construed to run
concurrently. OpxnMD, CaurrNAL PRocEmuE FROM AREsr To APPFAL 576 (1947).
Cumulative or aggregate penalties obviously constitute multiple punishment as well as
multiple conviction. In order to sentence concurrently, there also must be multiple con-
victions, but the question whether concurrent sentences in addition constitute multiple
punishment is a more complex one.
It has been argued that concurrent sentencing is tantamount to cumulative punishing
because it delays parole eligibility and in this way increases the penalty. This argument
has been accepted by some courts and rejected by others. In California, where such
sentences affect the judgment of the correctional agency that determines parole eligibility,
the argument has been accepted. People v. Craig, 17 Cal. 2d 453, 458, 459. 110 P.2d 403
(1941); People v. Kehoe, 33 Cal. 2d 711, 204 P.2d 321 (1949); People v. Keller, 27 Cal.
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William Wallace and David of Wales were punished. Wallace was
"drawn for treason, hanged for robbery and homicide and disembow-
elled for sacrilege, beheaded as an outlaw and quartered for divers
depredations."'' 1 2 David enjoyed a similar fate.103 Since the fourteenth
century, courts have exercised considerably more self-restraint. Michi-
gan courts have held that they can never cumulate sentences without
legislative authorization.16 4 In some jurisdictions, courts deny them-
selves power to punish cumulatively when offenses arise out of a single
act or transaction.1  In others, statutes accomplish the same end.10
Reptr. 805 (1963). For same result in Illinois, see People v. Schlenger, 13 I11. 2d 63. 147
N.E.2d 316 (1958). The New York Courts, under the aegis of a different correctional
system, have rejected the argument. People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140
N.E.2d 282, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1957); but see, People v. Ciaverelli, 11 App. Div. 2d 741, 204
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1960).
The federal courts generally do not treat concurrent sentences as greater punishment
than a single sentence of equal length. Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891);
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306 (1961); see cases cited in Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rlv.
726 n.A (1959). However, these cases fail to consider the questions raised by tile parole
and pardon argument. Once they have determined that the judgment and sentence on one
count of a multi-count indictment are valid and that the maximum permissible sentence
on this count alone exceeds the sentence actually given, they refuse to pass on the
validity of other disputed counts. By thus avoiding making the determination that the
judgment on one of several counts on which concurrent sentences have been given is
invalid, they never reach the question of whether the imposition of an invalid concurrent
sentence is prejudicial to a prisoner.
Other federal courts have rejected the Claassen presumption that the judge imposed
sentence solely on the good count and have thus left open the possibility of considering
the parole and pardon argument. Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687 (1896), United
States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958); see cases collected in Smith v, United States,
335 F.2d 270, 272 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In the Hines case Judge Clark directly considered
the parole argument:
Obviously the Claassen rule, especially as it applies to cases involving concurrent
sentences, presumes that . . . a defendant's punishment is no greater so long as he
must stay in prison for the same period of time. The validity of this presumption
is questionable. . . . [I]t does not take into account the stigma which attaches to
an accused from the conviction of two or more crimes, rather than one, or the prac-
tical effect on a prisoner now that the parole system is so widely applied. 256 F.2d
at 563; see Note, 107 U. PA. L. Ray. 726, 728 (1959).
This argument has also been recognized by the Sixth Circuit: "... they [concurrent
sentences] were still prejudicial, for it is well understood that a multiplicity of sentences
impairs a prisoner's opportunities for pardon or parole." Hibdon v. United States, 204
F.2d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 1953).
162. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 501 (2d ed. 1905).
163. Ibid.
164. E.g., In re Allison, 322 Mich. 49, 33 N.W.2d 917 (1948). See note 226 infra, and
the accompanying text.
165. E.g., People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d 257, 189 N.E.2d 299 (1963); Jones v. State,
19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770, appeal dismissed, 19 Ala. App. 685, 99 So. 926 (1924); Clem v.
State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873). For general discussion of same act and transaction tests, see notes
34 and 62 supra.
166. Note 34 supra.
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Some courts remain harsh, though.1 67 In the federal system, where
the Supreme Court has placed moderate limitations on the power to
cumulate punishments, 168 many lower courts have refused to restrain
themselves, even in cases which seem to fit the rationale of the Supreme
Court's limitation.169 Other courts purport to limit their power to
punish cumulatively for similar offenses, but define similar offenses
to allow cumulative punishment whenever offenses differ according to
the distinct elements test-whenever each has a distinct element not
included in the other.170 Finally even the courts which appear gentle
are sometimes harsh because they do not apply consistent standards
to determine when conduct constitutes a single punishable offense.
For example, the courts in the "same act" states have had considerable
difficulty in determining when conduct constitutes a single act.T'' And
courts which seek the same transaction or same intent fare no better.72
Neither the impulses of liberality nor those of harshness have been
justified upon consistent doctrinal bases. Both sets of courts apply the
double jeopardy principle blindly. Neither stops to ask what is wrong
with punishing cumulatively.
Cumulating punishments for closely related offenses is wrong for
the same reason as reprosecuting for related offenses. Both practices
grant prosecutors and judges power which cannot be justified. The
167. E.g., Commissioner ex rel. Miller v. Maroney, 179 Pa. Super. 305, 116 A.2d 755
(1955) (entering with intent to commit a felony and robbery with offensive weapon);
Copeland v. Manning, 234 S.C. 510, 514, 109 S.E.2d 361 (1959) (breaking and entering
with intent to steal and grand larceny).
The harshness of cumulative punishment has occasionally been commented upon by
appellate courts. But they refuse to review the trial court's sentence discretion. judge
Learned Hand said in Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir. 1932) that:
... this case does not present a situation ... which ... may fairly be regarded as
justifying cumulative sentences, and, therefore, though the power existed, it seems to
us here to have been plainly abused. We are not ourselves able to intervene, though
if we could, we should not hesitate to do so; but we have several times in the past
felt it to be within the proprieties to express our disapproval in similar cases . . .
and we do so again.
Judge Hand had used similar language in Amendola v. United States, 17 F.2d 529, 530
(2d Cir. 1927), and Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
Some defendants have argued that cumulative sentences violate the Eighth Amend-
ment (cruel and unusual punishment). Usually, this argument is unsuccessful. E.g., O'Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959).
Contra, State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 45 L.R.A. 561 (La. 1896).
168. See notes 248-258 infra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 268 and 269 infra and accompanying text.
170. E.g., Chambers v. State, 394 P.2d 778, 780 (Alaska 1964); United States v. Bauer,
198 F. Supp. 753, 754 (D.D.C. 1961). For discussion of the distinct elements test, ee
note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
171. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 62 and 66 supra and accompanying text.
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double jeopardy principle provides a sensible way of limiting arbitrary
discretion. But since each practice is arbitrary for different reasons,
and each raises very different problems, one rule or one offense-defin-
ing test should not apply to both.
Substantive Double Jeopardy Is Not a Limitation on the Legislature
In the multiple punishment context, the courts have tended to avoid
applying double jeopardy or have used the restrictive distinct elements
test because many have a mistaken view of its purpose. Many courts
understand the rule to be a restraint on the legislature's power to de-
fine and punish offenses, and are naturally reluctant to give teeth to
the prohibition. But the primary purpose of double jeopardy is to
limit discretion of courts and prosecutors. Indeed, double jeopardy's
prohibition of multiple punishment would be absurd as a substantive
limitation on the legislature.
Suppose that an eccentric legislature chose to enact this statute:
The sentence for robbery shall be five years' imprisonment.
Anyone who commits robbery shall be twice convicted and
sentenced.
Can it be said that this statute is outside the power of the legislature?
In form the statute commands that criminals be convicted and pun-
ished twice for a single offense. But in reality, the legislature has
merely exercised its legitimate penological power in a preposterously
roundabout fashion. It could have accomplished exactly the same
doubling of the penalties simply by doubling the penalty for robbery.
The doubling of convictions is likewise illusory. This statute could not
result in a defendant's being convicted twice for the same offense
because the second conviction is not a conviction at all. It is not an
independent determination of guilt, but rather an automatic conse-
quence of having been found guilty already. The only real significance
of the hypothetical statute is that the penalty has been doubled, and
increasing penalties is clearly within the power of the legislature. A
judicial veto of this statute would operate not as a substantive or peno-
logical restriction but as a literary critique of the legislature. There
is no doubt that the legislature can define offenses to provide explicitly
the penalty which will attach to a given kind of conduct. Double
jeopardy does not limit the legislature's power in this respect. Rather,
it limits the courts' power to cumulate convictions and punishment
when the legislature's will is not explicit.17- Judicial timidity on the
173. Frequently, the legislature does make explicit its intent to cumulate convictions
and punishment. E.g., 66 Stat. 228 (1952), 8 U.s.C. § 1324 (1958) provides that anyone who
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issue of multiple punishment thus arises from unfounded fear of limit-
ing the penological power of the legislature.
The relationship between legislative imprecision and double jeop-
ardy's bar against multiple punishment shows up clearly in the cele-
brated case, Gore v. United States,174 where the Court upheld six con-
victions and three consecutive sentences for three statutory crimes
arising out of two sales of narcotics.
Gore had been convicted on a multiple count indictment charging
him with violations of three statutes which, in brief, made it a crime to:
[1] sell . . . narcotic drugs except in pursuance of a written
order.. 175
[2] sell . . . narcotic drugs except in the original stamped
package...176
[3] sell ... any such narcotic drug... knowing the same to have
been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law.177
Gore argued that all three statutes proscribed the same offense, and
that the double jeopardy clause permitted only one conviction.178 He
contended that the same evidence test for the distinctness of an offense
did not provide adequate double jeopardy protection. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, erroneously but consistently with tradition, construed
this argument as necessarily an attack upon the power of the legis-
lature. He responded for the Court:
Suppose Congress, instead of enacting the three provisions
before us, had passed an enactment substantially in this form:
"Anyone who sells drugs except from the original stamped
package and who sells such drugs not in pursuance of a written
order of the person to whom the drug is sold, and who does so
by way of facilitating the concealment and sale of drugs knowing
the same to have been unlawfully imported, shall be sentenced
to not less than fifteen years imprisonment. Provided, however,
That if he makes such sale in pursuance of a written order of
aids an alien to enter the United States unlawfully "shall be punished by a fine
. . . for each alien .... " For interpretation of this section, see Sepulveda v. Squier.
192 F.2d 796 (1951). See also, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 406 (1944) (punishment for separate
crime comitted in building by burglar). For other examples, see RE.TATE iENTr, Dotun,
JEoPoADY § 22, IV(a), comment (Official Draft 1935).
174. 357 U-S. 386 (1958).
175. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 4705(a).
176. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 4704(a).
177. Narcotic Drugs Import & Export Act, 35 Stat. 614 (1909), 21 US.C. §§ 171-185
(1958) as amended, 65 Stat. 767 (1951), 21 US.C. § 174 (1958).
178. Gore argued that both legislative intent, Brief for Petitioner, pp. 17-51. Gore v.
United States, 357 US. 386 (1958), and the double jeopardy clause, id. at pp. 53-73, pre-
cluded multiple punishment.
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the person to whom the drug is sold he shall be sentenced to only
ten years' imprisonment: Provided further, That if he sells such
drugs in the original stamped package, he shall also be sentenced
to only ten years' imprisonment: And provided further, That if
he sells such drugs in pursuance of a written order and from a
stamped package, he shall be sentenced to only five years' impris-
onment." Is it conceivable that such a statute would not be within
the power of Congress? And is it rational to find such a statute
constitutional but to strike down the Blockburger doctrine [same
evidence test] as violative of the double jeopardy clause?'"
[Emphasis in part supplied.]
The fallacy of this argument should be clear: the statutes in Gore
were not the functional equivalent of the Court's hypothetical statute.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statute embodies the wisdom of the
very constitutional limitation it was designed to disparage. It is not
offensive precisely because it is definite, and leaves no room for arbi-
trary administration. It clearly relates specific conduct to its punish-
ment. In short, the answer to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's first question
is clearly "no," his statute would certainly be within Congress' power;
but the answer to his second question is "yes," the convictions could
violate the double jeopardy prohibition nevertheless.
Double Jeopardy Limits The Discretion of Courts and Prosecutors
The irony of the current interpretation of the bar against multiple
punishment is that in taking care not to "limit" the legislature's pre-
rogative, many courts have usurped a power constitutionally vested
in the legislature and have failed to apply the limitation where it is
required, namely, to themselves and to prosecutors. Current cumu-
lative punishment doctrine in many jurisdictions allows both courts
and prosecutors an utterly whimsical kind of discretion.
The profusion of modem statutory offense categories has given the
prosecutor vast discretion at every stage of the criminal process. He
may characterize, at will, the same criminal behavior as one or many
bffenses. s0 Frequently he chooses the judge who will hear the case, 181
and the judge follows his sentencing recommendation in many juris-
dictions.8 2 Parole rules frequently amplify the consequences of the
prosecutor's choice.'8 3 Thus, if the court is willing to cumulate punish-
179. 357 U.S. at 392-93.
180. Remington and Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple
Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rxv. 528, 530 and sources cited therein, n.6.
181. OFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FRoM ARsr TO APPEAL 383.84 (1947).
182. Id. at 535; Note, Identity of Offenses, 45 HARV. L. REv. 535, 536, nA (1932).
183. See note 161 supra, and note 197 infra.
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ment, the prosecutor can decide on the punishment and choose the
crime to fit.
The prosecutor's decision to proceed in few or many courts is not
reviewable,'1 and need not be based on legitimate tactical or penologi-
cal considerations. Indeed, there is evidence that defendants who have
gained notoriety8 5 and those who have offended the police' 80 are fre-
quently selected for multiple punishment. The power to effect cumu-
lative punishment gives the prosecutor a coercive weapon which he
may freely brandish in plea bargaining.18 7 Given the choice of contest-
ing guilt and risking crushing sentence, or pleading guilty to one of
the offenses, an uncertain defendant may well capitulate.1 8
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion has become wed to our
criminal procedure, but it is a marriage of convenience, and we need
not welcome the in-laws.18 9 Only recently have courts begun to speak
seriously of limiting prosecutorial discretion, and the first limitation
suggested was upon arbitrary choice of offense categories.10 All agree
that some discretion is unavoidable. But the compelling reasons for
letting the prosecutor allocate his limited resources and determine
whether the evidence warrants prosecution do not support his discre-
184. Remington and Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Of-
fender, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 528, 530.
185. He [the assistant District Attorney] pointed out that the particular case inlohed
armed robbery and was one as to which there was a great deal of public interest.
Therefore it is fair to assume that the number of warrants issued in this case repre-
sents, in general, the maximum which would be brought under any circumstances.
5 ASERcAx BAR FouNAxroN 56; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
186. 6 AimucA BAR FOUNDATION 133. State v. Jefferson, 40 N.J. Super. 466, 123 A.2d
579 (App. Div. 1956) (19 years for a drunken brawl which included assaulting the arrest-
ing officers).
187. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, 112 U. PA. L. REv'. 865, 868 (196-); Newman. Plead-
ing Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRmt. L., C. & P.S. 780.
784 (1956).
188. Actual examples are naturally rare. However, in Heideman v. United States, 281
F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1960), defendant alleged that the prosecutor had coerced a guilty plea
by threatening to ask for consecutive sentences. Id. at 807. Defendant was charged in a
six-count indictment with transporting, on one occasion, six forged money orders. He
contended that the prosecutor threatened to ask for sixty years imprisonment and a sixty
thousand dollar fine. Defendant then switched his plea to guilty. This case was in and
out of the courts for several years. 173 F. Supp. 574 (D.N.D. 1959); 189 F. Supp. 22-1
(D.N.D. 1960); 303 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1962). See also note 194 infra.
189. See ScMARTZ, PROFESSION REsroNsmILrrY AND Tin: ADN tL'sm~ioN OF CRlMINAL
JusTIcE 34-35 (1961) for general statement on scope of prosecutor's discretion.
190. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 972-77 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting
opinion of Bazelon, CJ.). Cf., Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 135-40 (1956) (dissent-
ing opinion of Black, J.).
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tion to seek multiple punishment.1 91 Nothing about the prosecutor's
role makes him fit to pass sentence.192
Of course, the ultimate sentencing determination is made by the
court, not the prosecutor. But the power to cumulate sentence may
be abused by courts as well. In United States v. Tateo,19 for example,
the judge coerced a guilty plea at trial by threatening defendant with
cumulative punishment. 94 Whether and to what extent lower court
judges have quietly used the power to cumulate sentence for "per-
suasive" purposes we cannot know. But certainly the power lends itself
well to subtle coercion or vindicative punishment. The arbitrariness
inherent in the power to cumulate convictions and punishment is not
limited to these opportunities for latent oppression. By its nature, it
is an arbitrary power.
Judicial discretion to convict and punish cumulatively for closely
related offenses is not the same as the discretion usually granted judges
to determine the length of a sentence. The two kinds of discretion
differ in source, scope, and purpose. To begin with, the former is
rarely granted explicitly; the latter always is. When a discretionary
power is assumed by inference, its extent is all the more uncertain.
Secondly, cumulated convictions allow the trial judge to impose fear-
fully long prison terms, terms much stiffer than normally permitted
by statute. 195 Since there is no appellate review of sentencing, the trial
judge's power will be totally unchecked. 10 Beyond its power over
prison terms, the court may brand the defendant a multiple offender
and prejudice his position with respect to parole.19
191. For a discussion of policies concerning prosecutorial discretion, see Note, Discre-
tion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1301 (1965).
192. Congress may vest the judge and jury with broad power to say how much pun-
ishment shall be imposed for a particular offense. But it is quite differrent to vest
such powers in a prosecuting attorney....
Berra v. United States, 351 US. 131, 140 (1956) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.); Hutch-
erson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citing with approval dissenting
opinion of Black, J. in Berra v. United States, supra).
193. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
194. Id. at 464. Tateo was tried on a five-count indictment. On the fourth day of the
trial, the judge threatened to sentence him, if he persisted with the trial, to a life sen-
tence plus consecutive sentences on the other charges. Tateo pled guilty.
195. E.g., Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959) (52 year sentence);
State v. Jefferson, 40 N.J. Super. 466, 123 A.2d 579 (App. Div. 1956) (19 years for a
drunken brawl). The lengthy terms are significant not only because they represent a
possible term of incarceration, but also because the defendant's parole eligibility may be
adversely affected. See note 161 supra and note 197 infra.
196. Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YAiX L.J. 379, 380 (1961).
The note, however, discusses an emerging line of cases which run contrary to the old rule.
E.g., Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
197. Some courts have held that concurrent sentencing is tantamount to cumulative
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Finally, and most importantly, power to cumulate punishments in-
volves an irrational kind of discretion. The aim of sentencing discre-
tion is individualized punishment. 98 The judge must determine the
criminal's capacity for rehabilitation, and society's appetite for retri-
bution, in each case.199 All species of psychological and biographical
information are relevant to both decisions. But one fact which is not
relevant is the number of closely related or overlapping offenses that
can be spun out of the defendant's conduct. If the pre-sentence investi-
gation of two criminals indicates them to be identical in all respects
except that one of them has been convicted of selling narcotics not in
the original package and with knowledge that they were illegally im-
ported, while the second defendant has been convicted only of the
latter offense, why should the judge be permitted to tailor the sentence
only for the "multiple offender"? The "rehabilitative logic" would
allow the judge absolute discretion in both cases; if he feels the statu-
tory penalty for the offense at hand is inappropriate for the offender,
he should be free to double the sentence in either case. Similarly, the
multiplicity of offenses is not relevant to individual characteristics,
for example intelligence or motive, which determine the retributive
component of a sentence.
Cumulative punishments probably more often reflect the judge's
evaluation of the offense than of the offender. Thus, in O'Neil v.
punishing because it delays parole eligibility. See note 161 supra. Consecutive sentencing
may even more obviously affect parole eligibility. Thus, in a jurisdiction where a prisoner
does not become eligible until the expiration of a percentage of his maximum sentence,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964) (one-third), cumulated maximums may delay parole eligi-
bility. Newcombe v. Carter, 291 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1961); Brown v. United States, 256
F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1958); Williamson v. Hardwick, 135 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ga. 1955), afl'd.
227 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.W. Va. 1952),
aff'd, 199 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1952). Similarly, when a prisoner does not become eligible
until the expiration of his minimum term, cumulated minimums may delay parole eligi-
bility. State v. Maxey, 42 N.J. 62, 66-67, 198 A.2d 768, 771 (1964).
Obviously, judges may use their power to cumulate sentences to interfere with the pa-
role process. Cf., RTmIN, THE LAW OF CRnMINAL CoRP.CroN 119 (1963). The current trend
in penological thinking is therefore to abolish completely the "minimum sentence" to
which parole keys. Id. at 150 and 416; MoDEL SENTENCING ACT § I (reprinted in 9 CRIME
AND DELmQUENCY 339 (1963)). For proposed treatment of multiple offenders, see MoDr.L
SENTENCING ACT §§ 19-22 ("Separate sentences of committment imposed on a defendant for
two or more crimes constituting a single criminal episode shall run concurrently." Id.
§22).
198. RuBIN, THE LAW oF CUIMINAL CORREC ION 680 (1963).
199. Of course many modern penologists exclude retribution as a legitimate purpose
of the criminal law. See, e.g., RuBN, THE LAw OF CRuINAL CORRECTION 691 (1963). For
the opposite view, see, Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, Rs JuiCrATAE
VI (1953) p. 224 (reprinted in part in DONNELLY, GorssTN, AND SCHWARTZ, CRII.AL
LAw 499-503 (1963)).
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Vermont,200 where defendant received a 54 year sentence for trafficking
in liquor, the judge probably cumulated the punishment because he
hated Demon Rum, not because the poor devil made a bad impression.
But judicial discretion is completely inappropriate when the sentence
reflects only general judgments about the crime.
The Legislature Should Determine Appropriate Sentences
The legislature is the proper institution to determine what punish-
ment, or range of punishment, is appropriate for different offenses.20
It alone can evaluate the complex considerations which determine the
punitive valuation given an offense. A proper penalty must reflect
elements of retribution, deterrence, restraint, and rehabilitation. '
Retributive considerations require sensitivity to the community's
moral sentiment. Deterrence considerations demand analysis of the
relative deterability of different offenses. An informed judgment
about scientific methods of prediction and treatment must precede any
decision about restraint or rehabilitation. The different theories of
punishment are not harmonious, and often one must be preferred over
others.20 3 Finally, the prescription of penalties requires continuing
awareness of the capabilities of the prison-treatment system. Deter-
mination of penalties, perhaps even more than the creation of offenses,
demands perspective and talent unavailable to a court.
Aside from its superior facilities, the legislature is the politically
appropriate institution to choose among theories of penology. The
only criteria for choice are public needs and moral sensibility, which
are normally evaluated by the legislature. The judiciary is expected
to veto punishments which offend its sense of civilization,"0 4 but has
no mandate to make routine political compromises.
Historically, the separation of legislative and judicial power in the
criminal law has been a major feature of the "principle of legality,"
200. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
201. In United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 93 (1820), Marshall, C.J.,
said:
[T]he power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.
It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain Its punish-
ment.
202. See generally DONNEU.Y, GoLDsmIN, AND SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAw 304-520 (1905).
203. Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 878, 386 (1952).
204. This power is vested in the judiciary by virtue of the Eighth Amendment (cruel
and unusual punishment). See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). Weems v.




or "rule of law" which sustains constitutional government.20 5 In Great
Britain, before Parliament became supreme, the criminal courts legis-
lated at will.20 With the rise of Parliament came gradual subordina-
tion of this common law power.207 American judges, especially con-
scious of the demands of the new constitutional system, were ready
to abjure all power to invent crimes. In 1812 the United States Su-
preme Court determined that the federal courts were creatures of
statute possessing no common law criminal jurisdiction.208 Even earlier,
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, trumpeting that the
Founders had no more love for the common law than they had for the
Star Chamber, disclaimed any such power.20 9 The justices were ex-
pressly concerned about the arbitrary power that would otherwise fall
into the hands of individual judges. The court took heed of the aims
of the Constitution: "to separate, define, and limit the constituent
powers of government....-"2 10
It is generally recognized today that a legislature is the appropriate
institution to define conduct as criminal.211 The federal courts have
no power to supplement Congress' catalogue of offenses.21"- A few state
courts cling to some vestige of the common law of crimes.2 13 In these
states, the court's exercise of its common law power has been reined
by constitutional limitations,214 and is confined to petty offenses.2 18
Even this withered common law power has been soundly criticized.210
With the limited view of their power to invent crimes the courts
could not consistently claim broad power to punish cumulatively.
Until Parliament changed the law, the English common law forbade
cumulative punishment for felonies.217 On the other hand, the English
205. HALL, GERLm. PmNcxPLis or CmuantJx LAw 31-32 (2d ed. 1960).
205. 1 STEPHEN, H ITORY OF THE CRIMINAL L~IV or ENGLAND 358-60 (1883).
207. Ibid.
208. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 31, 34 (1812).
209. State v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 112 (1819).
210. Id. at 120-21.
211. See note 201 supra.
212. See note 208 supra and accompanying text.
213. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955); Note.
Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1332 (1947).
214. Note, 47 CoLm. L. REv. supra, at 1335.
215. Id. at 1336.
216. Id. at 1337.
217. Rev v. Albury [1951] 1 All. E.R. 491. At common law a defendant could be tried
for only one felony at a trial. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIINAL LAw Or ECxLNO
291-92 (1883); STEPHEN, DIGFsr OF CImNAL LAiW 18 n.4 (1894). When most felonies
were punishable by death, the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois attaint
barred all felony prosecutions after a conviction. 2 HAimws, PL.EAs or ruE CRowx
524 (8th ed. 1824). If a criminal was convicted at common law of a felony and a mis-
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courts were often said to have had "inherent" power to cumulate pun-
ishments for multiple misdemeanors. 218 But this power was justified by,
and in some measure dependent upon, the broad misdemeanor sentenc-
ing discretion available to common law judges. 19 The Wilkes case,220
which is said to be the source of this inherent power, allowed cumula-
tive sentencing on the argument that the total sentence was less than
the court could have imposed on either count alone.22'
Even in misdemeanor cases, the English courts could be quite fas-
tidious in taking care not to exceed their power. In Crepps V.
Durden,22 2 decided a few years after Wilkes, a baker had been con-
victed of selling four "hot loaves of bread" on Sunday, and had been
fined for each of four convictions. Lord Mansfield held that since the
legislature intended "activity on Sunday" not "loaves of bread" to be
the unit of prosecution, the sentencing court had exceeded its juris-
diction. "If the Act of Parliament gives authority to levy but one
penalty, there is an end of the question, for there is no penalty at
common law." 223
Many courts in this country incorrectly found in these cases a com-
mon law rule for the inherent power to punish cumulatively for fel-
onies and misdemeanors alike.224 In some states, the legislature enacted
authorizing statutes. 225 And in several states the courts ruled that when
the legislature has not spoken, the courts have no power to cumulate
punishments, even for distinct offenses. 220 The question was raised in
the federal system in 1887, and the Third Circuit stated:
demeanor, the misdemeanor was said to merge with the felony for purposes of punish-
ment.
218. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAv 18 n.4 (1894); Rex v. Albury [1951] 1 All E.R.
491, 492; see also Queen v. Cutbush L.R. [1867] 2 Q.B. 379.
219. RuBIN, THE LAW or CRIMINAL ComRCTioNs 23 (1963); for precisely this analysis
of their "inherent power," see James v. Ward, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 271 (1859).
220. Wilkes v. Rex, 4 Brown, Parl. Cas. 360 (1767).
221. Id. at 366.
222. 2 Cowper's Reports 640, 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
223. Id. at 646.
224. E.g., People v. Forbes, 22 Cal. 136 (1863); State v. Smith, 5 Day 175 (Conn. 1811);
State v. Mahaney, 73 N.J.L. 53, 62 Atl. 265 (1905); and State v. Maxey, 42 N.J. 02, 198
A.2d 768 (1964).
225. Missouri, for example, enacted such a statute, but the State Supreme Court did
not seem anxious to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences under It. Ex pare
Meyers, 44 Mo. 279 (1869).
226. E.g., Miller v. Allen, 11 Ind. 389 (1858); James v. Ward, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 271
(1859); Ex parte Meyers, 44 Mo. 279 (1869); Bloom's Case, 153 Mich. 597, 19 N.W. 200
(1884); Lamphere's Case, 61 Mich. 105, 27 N.W. 882 (1886); In re Allison, 322 Mich. 491,
33 N.W.2d 917 (1948); and Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964). But
cf. Ex parte Huber, 334 Mich. 100, 53 N.W.2d 609 (1952), and In re Illova, 351 Mich.
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Perhaps these terms might have been lawfully made to take effect
successively... although there is no United States statute authoriz-
ing it to be done.227 [Emphasis added.]
A few months later in the Supreme Court, in In re Henry,=B adopted,
without discussion, the common law "rule" of inherent power. Con-
gress has never enacted a statute authorizing cumulative sentences even
for distinct offenses. But the rule of In re Henry is well established.=2
It would be rather late in the day to challenge the rule that a court
has inherent power to punish cumulatively for distinct offenses, al-
though such a claim continues to be made occasionally. Moreover, the
power to punish or refrain from punishing offenses which the legis-
lature intended the courts to punish is no more offensive to double
jeopardy or due process than any other sort of discretionary power.
However, when the legislature has not expressly created separately
convictable and punishable offenses, the judiciary usurps legislative
authority when it assumes the power to convict and punish cumu-
latively.
Legislative Intent Determines the Number of Convictable Offenses
At least since Crepps v. Durden 3° some courts have recognized their
institutional limitations, and have looked to legislative intent in deter-
mining how many convictable and punishable offenses have been cre-
ated by the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court began to be sensitive
to legislative intent in In re Snow.20' The defendant was sentenced
consecutively for three counts of plural cohabitation. Each count
charged cohabitation with the same two women in a different year.
The Supreme Court, noting that the prosecutorial and judicial offense-
splitting were "wholly arbitrary," permitted only one sentence to
stand.0 2 The Court implicitly relied on Congress' intent to punish
the entire course of conduct as a unit; indeed, the principal precedent
was Crepps v. Durden.2 3 Later cases confirmed the idea that legislative
204, 88 N.V.2d 589 (1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962, which were overruled by In re
Carey, 372 Mich. 378, 126 N.W.2d 727 (1964).
227. United States v. Patterson, 29 Fed. 775, 778-79 (1887).
228. 123 U.S. 372 (1887).
229. For an example of the current inherent power theory in the federal system see
Hill v. United States, 305 F.2d 245 (9th Cir., 1962).
230. See note 222 supra.
251. 120 US. 274, 283-86 (1887). The court did not rely upon express legislative in-
tent. But it relied upon the principle of Crepps v. Durden, note 222, supra, a legislative
intent case. Actually, the "continuing offense" rule seems to be a rule of statutory con.
struction.
232. Id. at 282.
233. Id. at 283-85.
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intent should determine the "unit of prosecution," and that this unit
and not its component parts ought to be punished.28 4
So long as the defendant violated a single statute, the courts could
recognize the course of conduct as the convictable offense. But when
a single transaction involved violations of several statutes, the court
felt obliged to allow at least one conviction per statute.28 5 In United
States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,230 for example, where the
defendant was charged on a 32 count indictment for violations of three
statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,287 the Court
refused to find 32 distinct offenses, one for each short-changed em-
ployee. It decided that the course of conduct was the offense, but that
each of the three statutory offenses was distinct; in other words, there
were three convictable offenses.218
It should be obvious that legislative intent is also relevant to mul-
tiple statutory offense cases. The mere existence of two statutory of-
fenses does not establish that the legislature intended each to be inde-
pendently convictable and punishable when both are committed in a
single course of conduct. It is just as likely that the legislature intended
only to provide two avenues of prosecution or create alternative classes
of wrongdoers differentiated by gradations in punishment.8 9 Thus,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 contains overlapping criminal sections
which subject a precinct official who intimidates a voter to conviction
on four counts, each punishable by five years and five thousand
dollars.240 Congress probably intended to facilitate prosecution by cov-
ering all species of wrongdoing and to ensure federal jurisdiction,
rather than to pyramid punishment. Similarly, Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren, dissenting in Gore, thought Congress' purpose in enacting the
three narcotics statutes was to provide the prosecutor with three meth-
ods of proceeding against a single category of wrongdoers--narcotics
peddlers.241
In cases involving repeated violations of a single statute, the courts
234. See text accompanying note 238 infra. But see, Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625
(1915), where the court permitted cumulative punishment for each of six mailbags appel-
lant had ripped open during a robbery.
235. E.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915) (cumulative punishment for breaking
and entering U.S. Post Office, and stealing property from that Post Office).
236. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
237. Ch. 676 §§ 6, 7, 11, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended 63 Stat. 910, 29 U.S.C. § 215,
216(a) (1949).
238. 344 U.S. at 224-25.
239. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957); Ingram v. United States, No.
18568 (D.C., Nov. 4, 1965).
240. 78 Stat. 443 (1965).
241. 357 U.S. 386, 395 (1958).
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have used the term unit of prosecution2 - to mean "the offense which
the legislature intended to create."243 Thus, if the unit of prosecution
for cohabitation 2" is held to be all the cohabitating perpetrated before
indictment the courts will not allow the conduct to be severed for
purposes of either prosecution or punishment.2-"1 But the distinction be-
tween units of prosecution and units of punishment must be observed
in multiple statute cases.246 Statutes which create only one punishable
offense-like the Voting Rights Act-are usually meant to permit
various theories of prosecution.
When the legislature clearly indicates in a statute its intent with
respect to the cumulation of convictions, the court's task of construc-
tion is at an end. And if legislative intent, though not proclaimed in
the statute, is nonetheless perfectly clear from legislative history, the
legislature's purpose should be honored. But in the vast majority of
cases, unequivocal legislative intent cannot honestly be found in the
statute or its official history.2 47 Thus the court must ordinarily resort
to presumptions about legislative intent-canons of construction-to
determine the unit of conviction created by a statute.
The Rule of Lenity and the Rule of Gore
The Supreme Court has devised a rule of construction for use in
the single statute context. According to this "rule of lenity"2 18 doubts
should be resolved against the creation of multiple units of conviction.
The rule was born in Bell v. United States40 which construed the
Mann Act to create but one unit of conviction even when more than
242. E.g., opening sentence of Bell v. United States, 349 US. 81 (1955); Ladner v.
United States, 358 U-S. 169, 174-75 (1958).
243. The "unit of prosecution" phraseology may be confusing because it implies that
a unit of prosecution equals a "unit of conviction." But the number of wa)s that an in-
dividual may incur criminal liability does not necessarily correspond to the number of
times he should be convicted and punished: the unit of prosecution need not be the
same as the unit of conviction or punishment.
244. See notes 251 and 232 supra, and accompanying text.
245. E.g., Guffe v. United States, 310 F.2d 753 (1962); United States v. Woody Fashions,
Inc., 190 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (1961); United States v. Personal Finance Co., 174 F. Supp.
871 (1959).
246. Permitting a liberal joinder of offenses increases the likelihood that the case will
be dedded on the merits. United States v. Universal CI.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 225
(1952).
247. Nevertheless, the majority will frequently discover one intent and the dissent an-
other. Gore v. United States, 357 US. 886, 390 and 394.
248. Ladner v. United States, 358 US. 169, 178 (1958) (referred to as the "policy" of
lenity). In addition to the rule of lenity cases discussed in the text accompanying notes
249-258 infra, see Castle v. United States, 368 U.S. 13 (1961); Milanovich v. United States,
365 US. 561 (1961).
249. 849 US. 81 (1955).
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one woman is transported at once in interstate commerce.5 0 Later, the
rule was applied by the Court to overlapping sections of the Federal
Bank Robbery Act. In Prince v. United States,2 1 the crime of entry
with intent to rob was held not cumulatively convictable with the
consummated robbery; 2 2 in Heflin v. United States,65 feloniously
receiving and feloniously taking were viewed as a single offense.2 14 In
Ladner v. United States,255 the Court unanimously used the rule of
lenity to prohibit multiple punishment when the defendant injured
two officers with one blast from a shotgun.258 The Court found that
the statute could have been read to mean that the single discharge of
the shotgun would constitute an "assault" without regard to the num-
ber of federal officers affected, as reasonably as it could have been read
to mean that as many "assaults" would be committed as there were
officers affected.257 Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative
history pointed clearly to either meaning. Under these circumstances,
the Court applied a policy of lenity and adopted the less harsh meaning.
When choice has to be made between two readings of what con-
duct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose
the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have
spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive
criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.2 8
The rule of lenity is in complete discord with the counterpoint
theme of substantive double jeopardy law-the rule of Gore.250 The
federal courts, following the lead of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Gore,
have exempted federal narcotics statutes from the rule of lenity and
have constructed a presumption of legislative harshness. 2 0 From the
observation that
If the legislation [here] reveals anything, it reveals the determina-
tion of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery-
250. Id. at 83.
251. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
252. Id. at 328-29.
253. 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
254. Id. at 419-20. See also, Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 561 (1961).
255. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
256. Id. at 178.
257. Id. at 177.
258. Id. at 177-78, quoting from United States v. Universal C.IT. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
259. See text accompanying notes 174-179 supra.
260. The cases in the aftermath of Gore are legion. E.g., Williams v. United States,
332 F.2d 308 (1964); Pellom v. United States, 321 F.2d 646 (1963); Loya v. United States,
310 F.2d 304 (1962).
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detection, prosecution and punishment-tighter and tighter [on
narcotics offenders].261
Mr. Justice Frankfurter deduced that each of the statutes created a
separate unit of conviction.26- The same presumption of harshness has
allowed the courts to discover multiple units of conviction in the over-
lap of substantive and conspiracy offenses.2613 In Pinkerton v. United
States,2 64 the common law rule that a conspiracy merges in the sub-
stantive offense 5 was rejected by a unanimous Court largely on
grounds of a presumption of harshness. The same result was reached
in Callanan v. United States,266 on grounds of a "tacit purpose" attrib-
uted to Congress to create multiple units of conviction.2617 Finally,
many of the lower federal courts have shown far more affection for
the rule of harshness than for the rule of lenity, and some have refused
to apply the latter to virtually any statute to which the Supreme Court
has not previously applied it.268 In Carlson v. United States, G0 for
261. 357 U.S. at 390.
262. Id. at 391.
263. See notes 265 and 281 infra.
264. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
265. There seems to be some confusion as to which merges into which. Pinkerton ar-
gued that the substantive offense merged into the conspiracy, Id. at 642, and the court,
treating this contention as the common law rule, rejected it. Id. at 643. Other courts and
commentators have stated that at common law the conspiracy, a misdemeanor, merged
into the substantive offense. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARv. L. REv. 920, 968 (1959).
The rationale for permitting cumulative punishment for conspiracy and the substan-
tive offense in the federal system is that they are directed at different evils. United States
v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1914). Other jurisdictions treat conspiracy as an inchoate
offense-according to the analysis proposed in the comment, a preparatory offense. In
these jurisdictions, a defendant cannot be cumulatively convicted and punished for con-
spiracy and substantive offense. See, e.g., 38 Ill. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-2 and 8-5.
266. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
267. Id. at 594. The lower federal courts naturally follow this rule. E.g., Hill v. United
States, 306 F.2d 245 (1962), receiving stolen money and conspiracy to commit that offense.
268. For example, in Carlson v. United States, 274 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1960), defendant
was sentenced to four consecutive four year terms (16 yrs.) for transporting, on one occa-
sion, four forged checks in interstate commerce. See also Heideman v. United States, 281
F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1960) (twenty five years for simultaneous transportation of six forged
money orders). For subsequent history of this case, see note 188 supra. Then. in Castle
v. United States, 368 U.S. 13 (1961) the Supreme Court agreed, per curium, with the rep.
resentations of the Solicitor General that these forged security cases are governed by the
rule of lenity, note 248 supra. See also Kessel v. United States, 303 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.
1962) (following Castle).
Also compare Hiller v. United States, 252 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
963 (1958), with Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), discussed in text accompany-
ing note 250 supra. Apparently, the sole distinction between Bell and Hiller is that in
the former case defendant transported two women in his car, while in the latter he
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example, the court sentenced defendant to four consecutive four-year
terms for transporting in interstate commerce four forged checks. Three
were for seventy-five dollars and one for fifty, and all were transported
on one occasion.2 70
The rule of lenity is not a casual presumption about legislative in-
tent, but a constitutionally compelled canon of construction. It re-
quires the legislature to specify clearly when overlapping statutes are
to allow cumulative sentences. It forbids courts to proliferate sentences
out of legislative silence. The rule of lenity is designed to prevent mul-
tiple judicial punishment for a single legislative offense-to preclude
substantive double jeopardy.
The rule of lenity is a penological analog to the rule of strict con-
struction. Together they require that liberty be forfeited only if the
legislature has clearly indicated that it should be, and only to the ex-
tent that it has plainly authorized. Both rules dictate that the punitive
powers of the state may be invoked only pursuant to a definite, general
and prospective prohibition, not at the arbitrary behest of public offi-
cials.271 Punishing convicted men is no less serious business than de-
ciding whether they can be convicted. 21 2
caused two women to "go and to be transported . upon . .. a common carrier." 252
F.2d at 55.
Some cases involve overlapping statutes rather than multiple violations of the same
statute, and are therefore less similar to the rule of lenity cases. E.g., Marshall v. United
States, 299 F.2d 141 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 958 (1962) (forging a check and uttering
it); Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1963) (breaking into Post Office with
intent to commit larceny and stealing government property); United States v. White, 156
F. Supp. 37 (1957) (possession of distilling apparatus, carrying on business of distilling,
making mash for distillation). See also, United States v. Trumblay, 286 F.2d 918 (7th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 852 (1961) (bank robbery and assault with deadly weapon).
269. 274 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1960). Presumably, after Castle v. United States, 368 U.S.
13 (1961), such a sentence would be improper. See note 268, supra.
270. 274 F.2d at 695.
271. The Supreme Court has frequently construed statutes strictly in order to limit
the arbitrary power which would otherwise be vested in administrative officials. In Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), for example, the Court narrowly construed the statutes
which authorized the Secretary of State to issue passports. 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1965) and 44 Stat. 885 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1965). The Director of the Pass.
port Office had refused to issue passports to the petitioners on the ground that they were
sympathizers with and members of the Communist Party. Since the right to exit (from
the nation) was within the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, id. at 129, the
Court was reluctant to impute to Congress an intent to give the Secretary "unbridled
discretion to grant or withhold a passport... for any substantive reason he may choose."
Id. at 128. The Court concluded that "if that 'liberty' is to be regulated, it must be pur-
suant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Id. at 129. A judge is no more fit
to decide ad hoc how many offenses a criminal has committed than is the Secretary of
State to determine capriciously who may leave the country. In both cases, standards
should be clearly enunciated by the body which is institutionally and politically the
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Double jeopardy precludes a judge from convicting and punishing
tvice for the same offense. If a court creates multiple units of punish-
ment ad hoc when, from all that appears in the statutes and their his-
tory, the legislature created only multiple units of prosecution, the
court offends double jeopardy by punishing twice for a single legisla-
tive offense. Double jeopardy therefore requires that in determining
the unit of punishment for related offenses, doubts should be resolved
against punishing tvice for what may be a single offense.
In a similar way, and for the same purpose, the ordinary rule of
strict construction requires that doubts in the construction of a penal
statute be resolved against including borderline conduct. Neither the
rule of lenity nor the rule of strict construction is a prospective limita-
tion on the legislature's penological power. Both are concerned with
limiting the arbitrary power of judges, not with supervising the kinds
of conduct a legislature can make criminal nor the penalties it may
impose. Both rules are judicial corollaries to the ex post facto clause.
They ensure that neither a greater range of conduct is criminal nor a
greater range of punishment permissible after a defendant has acted
than clearly was before.2 73
proper law-maker-the legislature. A criminal's liberty is no less arbitrarily infringed
upon than was Kent's, if the criminal is sent to prison for a term longer than the legis-
lature has authorized. Both kinds of liberty should be regulated by the legislature.
It has been pointed out that the "void for vagueness" doctrine has been used by the
Supreme Court to protect "individual freedom from arbitrary and discriminatory gov-
ernmental action .... " Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L REv. 67, 80 (1960). A vague statute confers carte blanche powvers
upon administrators and judges. They fill in the blanks which the legislature has delib-
erately or inadvertently left. The offensiveness of the "delegated" power will differ, nat-
urally, with the liberty infringed upon and the institutions to which it is delegated.
"Power given to courts appears more tolerable than power given to administrative agen-
cies .... Id. at 940. The offensiveness may also vary with the necessity of the delegation
-the infeasibility of any other sort of regulatory scheme. Id. at 95. The "delegation" to.
or more accurately, the "usurpation" by, the courts of the power to fill in the blanks
with respect to the numbers of punishable offenses is not at all necessary to the admin-
istration of criminal justice. More than that, it is irrational. And the liberty infringed
upon is perhaps the most sacred of all liberties-the right not to be arbitrarily impris-
oned.
272. The prevailing attitude today seems to be that punishing is less serious, or at
least requires less official supervision, than determining whether conduct comes within
the criminal provision. (Thus, the trial court's sentence is not subject to review. See note
196 supra.) It has been suggested, probably quite correctly, that the latter judicial ac-
tivity has been scrutinized more carefully than the former because the latter concerns
"the mass of respectable citizens," while the former "affects only proven criminals." HALL,
GENERAL PEXNcRPLEs OF C~rnNAL IAw 55 (2d ed. 1960). Hall concludes that "if anything
can be done to any convicted person, the guarantee of legality has in fact vanished en-
tirely." Id. at 55-56.
273. It has long been recognized that the ex post facto limitation applies not only to
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Other Rules of Construction
The most serviceable rules of construction have been developed by
Kirchheimer.274 He identifies three relationships between offenses
which indicate that multiple punishment was not clearly intended.
Two statutes are alternatives if conviction under one is inconsistent
with conviction under the other for the same criminal conduct.26 For
example, larceny and receiving stolen goods are alternative offenses-
a defendant may have secured control over another's property by one
or the other means, but not by both.27 Secondly, an offense is included
in another if violation of the second always involves violation of the
first.27 7 An attempt, for example, is necessarily included in the consum-
laws which make "an action done before the passing of the law, and which was Innocent
when done, criminal," but also to laws which "aggravate the crime, or increase the pun-
ishment ...." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dali.) 386, 390 (1798), cited with approval In Boule
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964).
The Court has recently clearly stated the relationship between the ex post facto clause
and the rule of strict construction.
If a ... legislature is barred by the Ex post Facto Clause from passing such a law,
it must follow that a . . .[c]ourt is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving
precisely the same result by judicial construction. Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra
at 353-54 (1964).
The traditional rationale for the rule of strict construction, like the "void for vague-
ness" doctrine, is that individuals must be given fair warning. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Though with respect to a limited class of crimes--that of
the white collar variety--"fair warning" may be an important consideration, most observ-
ers have found the fair warning rationale in general unsatisfactory. Amsterdam, The Void
for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 82-83 n.79 (1960).
Holmes, J., recognized that the warning rationale, conceived of as necessary for Informing
robbers and murderers, was unrealistic. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
Its "unrealism" is underscored by the fact that "mistake of law"--a defense concerning
fair warning-is commonly not recognized in the criminal law. But insofar as warning
is a tenable rationale with respect to the conduct which a statute prohibits--particularly
in the white collar cases-it is no less tenable with respect to the deprivation to which an
offender becomes liable.
A better explanation of the strict construction doctrine, however, is that It limits the
power of courts to create offenses and prescribe penalties. This rationale has been pro.
posed for the vagueness doctrine, at least as a supplement to the warning theory. See
note 271 supra. The vagueness doctrine is analogous to the rule of strict construction. See
generally, Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal
Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 531 (1950). And both doctrines have the common aim of preventing
arbitrary governmental action.
274. Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
275. Id. at 516-17.
276. E.g., Milonavich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1965); Bargessor v. State, 95 Fla.
404, 116 So. 12 (1928). Another pair of statutes bearing the relationship of alternatlvity
are manslaughter and murder. The defendant may have acted either negligently or with
premeditation, but it is logically imposible that he acted negligently and with preinedi-
tation.
277. Kirchheimer uses the term "speciality" to encompass statutes bearing this relation-
ship of inclusivity. Kirchheimer, supra note 274, at 517-18.
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mated crime; 278 lower grades of the same kind of conduct are neces-
sarily included in the more serious grades, 270 and inclusive offenses may
be constructed using lesser offenses as elements. Finally, one offense is
preparatory if it is ordinarily committed in preparation for another. 0
This category, unlike the others, does not involve a definitional rela-
tionship between the offenses. Thus possessing liquor is a usual, but
not necessary, prerequisite to selling it.-"s1 The preparatory relationship
between some offenses is so strong that one offense is almost necessarily
included in the other-for example, entry into a bank with intent to
rob and bank robbery.28 When a strong connection exists, it is more
sensible to assume that the legislature created the preparatory offense
in order to punish the unsuccessful criminal rather than to cumulate
punishment for the successful criminal.28 3
The principle underlying the preparation rule can be generalized.
When separate offenses are commonly committed together, they should
be construed to create a single unit of conviction. This canon is sharp-
ened by Kirchheimer's fourth category: distinctness of evil.284 If sev-
eral statutes are not only usually violated together but also seem de-
signed to protect the same social interest, the inference becomes very
strong that the function of the multiple statutes is only to allow alter-
native means of prosecution. Selling narcotics in an unstamped pack-
age and selling the same narcotics not pursuant to a written order
278. E.g., Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943).
279. For instance, simple assault is necessarily included in assault with intent to kill.
People v. Thames, 59 Cal. App. 2d 585, 139 P.2d 359 (1943). And assault with intent to com-
mit rape is necessarily included in the crime of rape. State v. Birckhead, 124 S.E.2d 838
(1962). This pair of offenses also fits Kirchheimer's category of "consumption" or "sub-
sidiarity." See note 280 infra.
280. Kirchheimer terms the relationship between offenses, one of which applies to an
earlier stage of unitary criminal behavior than the other, "consumption" or "subsidiarity."
He includes in this category: attempt and the consummated crime (though it would
appear that this pair fits more appropriately into the category designated "speciality ),
conspiracy and the substantive offense, and burglary and larceny. Kirchheimer, supra note
274, at 518.
281. But see Albrecht v. United States, 273 US. 1, 11 (1926). The conspiracy-substantive
offense case should also come within the preparatory classification. See note 265 supra.
282. E.g., Prince v. United States, 352 US. 322 (1957).
283. For a discussion of the different but related doctrine of "necessarily included
act" which emerges from some recent California decisions, e.g., People v. Marshall, 48
Cal. 2d 594, 309 P.2d 456 (1957), see Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 735, 746-53 (1959).
284. Kirchheimer, supra note 274, at 522-23. If, by one act of intercourse, the defendant
commits incest and rape, Kirchheimer would permit multiple punishment on the theory
that each statute was designed to protect a different societal interest: deterring sex rela-
tions between dose blood relatives; and protecting women from sexual assaults. This
analysis is not entirely satisfactory. See text accompanying notes 288 and 289 infra. See,
e.g., Burdue v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 428, 138 S.W. 296 (1911).
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would not be cumulatively convictable if it could be shown that the
statutes were both designed to prevent the same "distinct evil": "the
nonmedicinal sale and use of narcotics." 285
Many cases can be resolved easily using the distinct evil test. A de-
fendant consecutively sentenced for taking a letter from an authorized
mail depository and possessing the contents of that letter has been pun-
ished twice for what should have been construed as one punishable of-
fense.286 It seems clear that both statutes287 were aimed at the same evil
-stealing mail-and were intended to provide the prosecutor with an
alternative method of proving a violation.
Kirschheimer expected too much of the distinct evils canon, failing
to recognize that "evils" can be as prolific or inclusive as "acts."2 8
Thus, even in a case where Kirschheimer thought the evils were clearly
distinct-adultery and incest committed in a singe intercourse-it is
possible to argue that only one evil-aberrant sexual behavior-was
being protected against. Similarly, Gore contended that only the sin-
gle social interest of preventing the ultimate sale and use of narcotics
underlay the three statutes pursuant to which he was convicted. But at
least on their faces, the three statutes were aimed at quite different
problems, two at evasion of a federal tax and one at the illegal impor-
tation of narcotics. 289 In short, the quest for a statute's distinct evil
often begins with the conclusion.
The distinct evil test can be applied with the help of subsidiary can-
ons. Inferences can often be made from the penalty scheme of various
statutes. If the punishment attached to an offense is exaggerated to
allow kindred crimes to be avenged, these related offenses should not be
punishable separately. Kidnapping usually carries a death sentence be-
285. Brief for the petitioner, p. 16, Gore v. United States, 857 U.S. 886 (1958).
286. E.g., Creed v. United States, 283 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1960).
287. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1702, 1708.
288. In United States v. Beene, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 15 C.M.R. 177 (1954), the Court of
Military Appeals rejected the same evidence test in favor of the distinct evil or separate
norms test. The court then went on to hold that statutes authorizing punishment for
drunken driving and for manslaughter "are characterized by two gravamina, two ethical
norms, two duties . . . " and thus that the defendant could be cumulatively punished
for a negligent killing which resulted from his drunken driving. The court could just is
easily have held that the statutes were aimed at preventing the same evil: negligent or
reckless killing. The drunken driving statute was arguably designed to permit tile arrest
of potential manslaughterers before they commit the ultimate offense, In the same way
as an attempt statute permits arrest before the consummated crime. Even to the extent
that the drunken driving statute is intended to deter driving while Inoxicated, the
ultimate evil it is designed to prevent is maiming or killing resulting from careless
driving.
289. See notes 175, 176, and 177 supra.
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cause kidnappers often are not content to share candy. Thus, rape and
kidnapping or murder and kidnapping should not be punished cumu-
latively. Finally, when offenses differ only because they have different
jurisdictional bases they should not be punished cumulatively. Rob-
bing a federally insured bank and transporting the stolen property
across state lines should not be punished twice.- 0
All of these canons of construction will be useful in discovering the
relationships amongst overlapping offenses. However, difficult cases
will remain. In these the rule of lenity must prevail. For example, in
Ingram v. United States,291 defendant was consecutively sentenced for
assault with intent to kill and assault with a dangerous weapon. The
Criminal Code set out four kinds of assault: Assault with intent to kill,
rob, rape, or poison (fifteen years); Assault with intent to commit may-
hem or with a dangerous weapon (ten years); Assault with intent to
commit any other offense (five years); and Simple Assault (one year). 2
This statutory scheme might suggest that the legislature did not intend
Ingram to be sentenced consecutively since both the offense categories
prevent the same evil-infliction of serious injury. Further, when a de-
fendant assaults with intent to kill he usually does so with a dangerous
weapon, and when a defendant assaults with a deadly weapon he often
does so with intent to kill, rob, rape, or poison. Since the two offenses
occur together so often, a court should not presume that the legislature
intended multiple punishment. A legislature which wanted multiple
conviction could have said so explicitly.0 3 On the other hand, the
two offenses might be construed as directed against distinct evils,
namely, inflicting serious injury and using a particular kind of weapon
which increases the chance of serious injury. The legislature might
have felt that intending to kill with a dangerous weapon is worse
than intending to kill with no weapon. The conflict between these
two theories can not be resolved by using the suggested methods
of statutory construction. The categories involve no jurisdictional ele-
ments. Nor does the penalty scheme help. When a conflict like this one
occurs the presumption must be in favor of lenity. Cumulative punish-
ment should be permissible only when the legislature has clearly pro-
vided for it in order to serve some legitimate purpose, not because the
ancient urge to punish smoulders in a judge.
290. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 334 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 935 (1965) (consecutive sentences upheld).
291. Ingram v. United States, No. 18568, (D.C. Cir., Nov. 4, 1965).
292. D.C. Code § 22-501; § 22-502; § 22-503; § 22-504.
293. See note 173 supra.
